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by Adrienne Silnicki  
 
       Abstract 
 
Today, despite the vast resources given to stop the spread of HIV/AIDS in Uganda, the 
national prevalence continues to grow.  
 
The U.S. developed the President's Emergency Plan for HIV/AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) as a 
response to the insufficient global effort to halt the spread of HIV/AIDS internationally. 
 
PEPFAR has tied foreign aid to an HIV/AIDS agenda that is based on politics and 
religion, not on evidence.  By promoting an abstinence-only approach to HIV/AIDS 
education and limiting international funding to only organizations that agree to restrict 
sexual health access for many people, including sex workers.   
 
This thesis is about understanding the complex relationship between aid donors and 
recipients when evidence, politics and religion clash. 
 
I conclude this thesis by finding that HIV/AIDS campaigns in Uganda are compromised 














Table of Contents 
Abstract ............................................................................................................................................. ii 
Acknowledgments ............................................................................................................................. v 
List of Acronyms and Abbreviations ................................................................................................ vi 
Chapter 1: Introduction and Research Methodology ...................................................................... 1 
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1 
Background on Foreign Aid .............................................................................................................. 4 
Global Health and Foreign Aid ......................................................................................................... 7 
PEPFAR ........................................................................................................................................... 10 
U.S.’ Struggle with Prevention ....................................................................................................... 11 
Prevention ...................................................................................................................................... 12 
Uganda ........................................................................................................................................... 14 
Rational for the study .................................................................................................................... 17 
Research Statement ....................................................................................................................... 18 
Main argument .............................................................................................................................. 19 
Methodology .................................................................................................................................. 21 
Critical Theory ................................................................................................................................ 22 
Justification for the study .............................................................................................................. 24 
Limitations of this study ................................................................................................................. 27 
Required information ..................................................................................................................... 28 
Data Collection Techniques ........................................................................................................... 29 
Documents ..................................................................................................................................... 33 
 
Chapter 2: Literature Review ......................................................................................................... 34 
Foreign Aid and Development- Who gets to decide ...................................................................... 35 
U.S. and Foreign Aid ....................................................................................................................... 42 
Foreign Aid and Health .................................................................................................................. 46 
Foreign Aid and HIV/AIDS: Where is the money going? ................................................................ 52 






Chapter 3: Findings ........................................................................................................................ 60 
Uganda's HIV/AIDS prevention programme: Before PEPFAR ........................................................ 60 
The start of the HIV/AIDS Epidemic in the U.S. ............................................................................. 62 
The Rise of HIV/AIDS in Uganda and the U.S. ................................................................................ 64 
PEPFAR Changes the Global Response to HIV/AIDS ...................................................................... 68 
A Local Fight goes Global ............................................................................................................... 68 
The Need for Evidence ................................................................................................................... 71 
Spreading the ‘Good’ Word ........................................................................................................... 73 
How PEPFAR is changing the HIV/AIDS policies of Uganda ........................................................... 76 
Uganda Adopts AB ......................................................................................................................... 82 
The Condom Shortage ................................................................................................................... 85 
How PEPFAR might have affected Uganda’s HIV/AIDS prevalence ............................................... 88 
The need for a culturally appropriate HIV/AIDS response ............................................................ 92 
 
Chapter 4: Conclusions and Recommendations ............................................................................ 94 
 
Appendix A1: .................................................................................................................................. 98 
Appendix A2: Chart of international HIV/AIDS funding and HIV/AIDS prevalence in Uganda ...... 99 
Appendix A3: Collection of data technique: Scoping ................................................................... 100 
 















I would like to express the deepest appreciation to my supervisor Dr. Robert Huish, who 
has shown immeasurable patience and encouragement despite many obstacles. His 
thoughtful recommendations and suggestions were immeasurably appreciated. Without 
his supervision and help this dissertation would not have been possible. 
 I would like to thank my committee members, Dr. Peter Twohig and Dr. Owen Willis, 
whose insight into epidemiological practices, health care, political science and the reality 
of Uganda pushed the conversation of this thesis into areas that may otherwise have not 
been more fully explored.  
 I have an incredible amount of gratitude to my wonderful family. To my poppa, Marc 
Silnicki, who called regularly to check in on my progress and gently encourage me to 
continue moving forward despite my ranting and raving, And to my partner, Christopher 
Hardie, who supported me through trying times and always knew when to suggest a hot 
cup of tea and then promptly sent me back to the writing den.  
I offer many thanks to the people of Misufini, Kenya and the Imani Project who 
introduced this topic to me and allowed me to study it while living in their community. I 
am very appreciative of you assistance and inspired by your determination to ensure an 
AIDS-free generation.  
Lastly, this thesis is dedicated to the memory of Mary, Laura, and Jan who I miss greatly 
every day, I wish you were here to finally celebrate this graduation. 





List of Acronyms and Abbreviations 
AB: Abstinence and Be faithful 
Abuja Declaration: The 2001Abuja Declaration on HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Other 
       Infectious Diseases 
ABC: Abstinence, Be faithful, use a Condom (or ‘Condomise’) 
A-only: Abstinence-only 
AIDS: Acute Immune Deficiency Syndrome  
APP: Anti-prostitution pledge 
ART: Antiretroviral therapy 
ARV: Antiretroviral  
CDC: Centre for Disease Control 
COP: Country Operational Plan  
FAO: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 
Global Fund: The Global Fund for AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria 
HAART: Highly Active Antiretroviral Therapy 
HIV: Human Immunodeficiency Virus 
MOH: Ministry of Health 
MSF: Médecins Sans Frontières  
NGO: Non-Governmental Organization 
OGAC: Office of the United States Global AIDS Coordinator 
PEPFAR: The US President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief  
SAPs: Structural Adjustment Programs 
STI: Sexually Transmitted Infection 
TASO: The AIDS Support Organization  
UAC: Uganda AIDS Commission 
UN: United Nations 
UNAIDS: The Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS 
UNGASS: United Nations General Assembly Special Session 
U.S.: United States 
USAID: United States Agency for International Development 
USD: United States Dollars 







Chapter 1: Introduction and Research Methodology 
 
Introduction 
 The Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) and Acquired Immune Deficiency 
Syndrome (AIDS) have been the cause of a global pandemic since the early 1980s.  It is 
estimated that over 25 million people have died as a result of contracting HIV (UNAIDS 
Global Report, 2008).  Seventy-five percent of those deaths occurred in Sub-Saharan 
Africa (UNAIDS Global Report, 2008).  
  HIV/AIDS is one of the greatest obstacles to development. Sub-Saharan Africa has 
10 per cent of the world’s population but 60 per cent of the world’s population living with 
HIV/AIDS (University of Glasgow, n.d.). HIV/AIDS has changed the population 
structures of several Sub-Saharan African countries. Despite increasing access to health 
institutions and clean water, life expectancy in many Sub-Saharan African countries are 
shorter today than they were in the 1980s as a result of HIV/AIDS (University of 
Glasgow, n.d.).  
  Globally 17.3 million children have lost one or both parents to HIV/AIDS. 
Orphaned children are twice as likely as children with living parents to drop out of school 
and they are at a greater risk of homelessness and poverty (UNICEF, 2013). Although 
international aid flows for HIV/AIDS have been generous, the high costs of ARVs 
outstrip the resources available and leave many people without access to treatment (Joint 
United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS, 2005, cited by: Canning, 2006).  
  HIV/AIDS has added enormous pressure to the capacity of national health care 
systems, it has caused high occupancy rates in hospitals, and it has brought about more 




  The HIV/AIDS epidemic in developing countries places financial strain on 
households. HIV/AIDS has caused the loss of income earners because people are too sick 
to work, they die, or they had to leave work to care for a sick family member (AVERT, 
n.d.b). HIV/AIDS has added more dependents to households when children are orphaned 
by AIDS (AVERT, n.d.b). The cost of HIV/AIDS treatment is expensive and funeral costs 
are high (AVERT, n.d. b).  
  HIV/AIDS has caused food shortages in some countries due to the impact on 
labour. Malawi reported a food shortage in part due to HIV/AIDS in 2005 (BBC, 2005). 
Agriculture is heavily labour dependent. Sick individuals are often unable to participate. 
The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) estimates that 
approximately 23 million agricultural workers will die by 2020 (2003). The FAO also 
notes that because many African countries are still heavily dependent on agriculture for 
export, the loss of agricultural workers will have a significant impact on countries’ 
economies (2003).  HIV/AIDS has been declared a development crisis by the World Bank 
(The World Bank: Africa Region, 2000).  
  The global north managed to keep the rate of HIV transmission at less than one per 
cent (AVERT, 2011).  Yet countries in the global south are still struggling with high 
transmission rates despite billions of dollars in foreign aid, the work of thousands of 
grassroots organizations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), international forums, 
United Nations agencies, and the promises of governments around the world to halt the 
spread of this virus.  
Uganda is one of the few countries in the Global South that experienced a dramatic and 
rapid decline in the spread of HIV/AIDS. Between the years 1990 to 2002, HIV/AIDS 




stagnation of the HIV/AIDS rates and the subsequent increase coincided with a radical 
shift in HIV/AIDS prevention programming.                                                              
 Before 2002, Uganda’s government promoted a comprehensive sexual health 
programme which focused on “zero grazing” (only having sex with committed partners), 
“just chill” (abstinence), and both education on correct and consistent condom use and the 
distribution of condoms. The prevention programmes were aimed at everyone in the 
country including sex workers. This approach has been praised as a major contributor to 
the initial decline in Uganda`s HIV/AIDS rates.                                                                                                                                
  In 2002 and 2004, First Lady Janet Museveni and President Yoweri Museveni 
(respectively) stopped promoting condoms and instead suggested that Ugandans did not 
require condoms to decrease HIV/AIDS rates (Epstein, 2005 and Tumushabe, 2006 
respectively).                                                                                      
 In 2003, the U.S. government announced a new international HIV/AIDS program 
(PEPFAR) which gave an unprecedented amount- $15 billion in 5 years- of funds to 
Uganda for the purposes of HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment. PEPFAR’s funding far 
surpassed any other bilateral and even multilateral funding source, but required Uganda to 
focus at least 33per cent of its prevention efforts on abstinence-only programming and 
required recipients to sign an anti-prostitution pledge (APP) promising to not work with 
sex workers (Office of the U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator, 2006).  As a result, this change 
in narrative created a politics of contention in Uganda, and created a divisive and 





Background on Foreign Aid 
  Since the 1940s
1
, foreign aid has been given to countries for a diversity of reasons. 
During times of humanitarian need, such as war or natural disasters, foreign aid is often 
available from other countries, international NGOs, and individual donors.  A recent 
example is the 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami that received an estimated $16 
billion USD from global pledges (Jayasuriya and McCawley, 2010).  
  Sometimes aid is given to gain power and influence (Browne, 2006). Browne uses 
the example that aid was given during the Cold war rather than during the 1990s when 
countries needed it more (2006). Browne suggests that this is because donors had more to 
gain in terms of power and influence during the Cold War when they were trying to 
convince the Global South to resist communism (2006).  
  Hayter suggests imperialism is at the heart of foreign aid (Hayter, 1971). Hayter 
argues that for donor countries aid is simply an opportunity to promote their own agenda 
and force recipients to adopt that agenda.  It spreads the global north’s political agenda 
globally (Hayter, 1971). 
  Taylor and De Campos describe the ability of aid to ensure the safety of expats and 
overseas military personnel (1979; 1998 respectively). With regards to hygiene and 
health, Taylor and De Campos describe aid being used to build hospitals and create 
infrastructure to clean and drain water (1979; 1998). This keeps military troops and 
expats safe from cholera and malaria. Health and hygiene infrastructure often has the 
additional impact on people living nearby expat and military compounds where they may 
                                                 
1 This paper looks at development aid post-1944. Many 
works cite the Bretton Woods conference as the beginning 
of modern international aid and our current international 
economic system (Moyo, 2009, 10; Hellinger et al., 1988, 




also benefit from the additional infrastructure (Taylor, 1979; De Campos, 1998).   
  Aid has also been used as a tool for nation-building. Easterly (2011) argues that the 
US defence department has co-opted aid and is now using it to try and win the hearts and 
minds of recipient countries (2011). He argues that foreign aid is being misdirected and 
sent to warring countries where it is not accepted as a tool for development, but instead it 
is seen as a way to help aid agencies become rich (2011). He sees this use of foreign aid 
as a failed attempt to nation-build and argues that money should be spent on targeted and 
historically successful programmes such as building infrastructure, education and health 
care improvements (2011).  
  For citizens of the global north, foreign aid during the time of an HIV/AIDS 
pandemic has been used to keep them “safe” (Usdin, 2003). In the aftermath of 
September 11
th
, questions and concerns were being raised by US security committees on 
the desperation of People Living with HIV/AIDS (PLWHAs) were experiencing in 
developing countries (Sheehan, 2011). Children orphaned by HIV/AIDS and those with 
few economic options were deemed a security risk (Sheehan, 2011). The use of foreign 
aid to grow the economies of the global south and relieve some of that desperation was 
one way to secure the safety of the global north (Sheehan, 2011). Usdin (2003) quotes 
Stephen Lewis, former head of the UN Special Envoy for HIV/AIDS in Africa, as saying 
“no-one diminishes the question of security...but it does say something about the way we 
respond to the human condition” (2003, 27).  
  Outside of the HIV/AIDS epidemic, U.S. foreign aid has often been used to provide 
safety to the global north by strengthening fragile states, and “mitigating global and 
transnational ills” (Birn et al., 2009, 181). The U.S. Government claims that they 




  Moyo claims that foreign aid is used by donor countries to make recipient countries 
better trading partners (Moyo, 2009). Aid is often tied to procurement policies that 
guarantee the donor countries’ products are purchased and their citizens are hired (Moyo, 
2009).  
  Foreign aid may also be used to promote donor countries’ diplomatic, commercial 
and cultural interests (Hudson and Goulet, 1971; Hopkins, 2000). Hopkins argues that 
countries which already share similar political philosophies may be more likely to enter 
into an aid relationship (2000).  
  But, as Riddell states, the primary reason to give aid should be for the acceleration 
of development (Riddell, 1987). If HIV/AIDS is a development issue, then reducing the 
spread of HIV/AIDS would accelerate development. In the 1980s, Uganda’s rate of 
HIV/AIDS incidence was falling. From 1979-1985, Uganda was receiving $2,440,189.11 
USD
2
 in foreign aid (Holmgren et al, 1999; CoinNews Media Group). Today, Uganda’s 
HIV/AIDS rate of contraction is ceasing to decline at rates previously experienced and 
yet foreign aid to Uganda in 2011 was at $1.6 billion USD (Global Humanitarian 
Assistance, n.d.). If Riddell is correct, this infusion of foreign aid decreases the rate at 
which HIV/AIDS is spreading in a community. But that is not happening. HIV/AIDS has 
been shown to accelerate in Uganda since mass infusions of foreign aid have come into 
the country. So consistent with Riddell’s writing, aid may not be “necessary or a sufficient 
condition for development to begin or continue”. However, contrary to Riddell’s writing, 
it does not appear that aid is “accelerating” the development process (1987, 102).  
                                                 
2
 Uganda received $1,126,552 USD between the years 1979-
1985 (Holmgren et al., 1999) from international aid. Using 
the US inflation calculator, I have adjusted this amount for 
inflation and $1,126,552 USD would be $2,440,189.11 




Global Health and Foreign Aid 
  This thesis will not offer a fulsome account of the history of global health. 
However, relying on text from Lieberman (2009), Kickbusch (2000), and others, I will 
briefly explore the topic to offer readers a brief introduction to the role of the international 
community in global health.  
  The international community’s first global health action may have begun in 
Dubrovnik in 1377 (Lieberman, 2009). The Rector Ragusa of Dubrovnik’s quarantined 
ships traveling from countries infected with the plague (Lieberman, 2009).  
  In 1851 to address sanitation in response to cholera, plague, and yellow fever the 
first international conference on health care was held (Lieberman, 2009). This was 
followed in 1899 and 1902 with conferences on syphilis and venereal diseases 
(Lieberman).  
  In 1910, the Rockefeller Foundation began a national (U.S.) anti-hookworm 
campaign (Rockefeller, n.d.). In 1914, the International Health Division of the 
Rockefeller Foundation was created and  it expanded the hookworm campaign expanded 
globally (Rockfeller, n.d.). According to Kavadi the Rockefeller’s hookworm campaign 
created a “culture of public health” (Kavadi, 2007). 
  By 1978 and the Alma Ata Conference, several international conferences and 
organizations have been established to create global responses to epidemics and 
contagious health concerns (Lieberman, 2009). Yet Kickbusch considers the Alma Ata 
Conference (1978) to be the beginning of an international response to global health care 
(Kickbusch, 2000 cited Koivusal & Ollila, 1997).    
  The Alma Ata declaration “strongly reaffirms that health…is a fundamental human 




world-wide social goal…” (Alma Ata, 1978, Declaration I). Alma Ata made it clear that 
all governments that committed to the declaration were responsible for the health of their 
people and to assist other countries in need (Kickbusch, 2000). 
  But Magawa points out the flaws with Alma Ata (2012). Health care delivery 
systems in the global south were modeled from the systems of the global north (Magawa, 
2012). As Taylor and De Campos pointed out that hygienic and health infrastructure were 
introduced to some countries by colonial governments to look after their own militaries 
and expats (1979; 1998 respectively). Now those global north health care delivery models 
have left a preference for high-tech, urban-centric, and curative health care that is 
dependent on hospitals and specialists (Magawa, 2012). This model of health care is 
inappropriate for many countries in the global south as is it expensive and allows for 70 
per cent of health care services to be spent on only 30 per cent of the population 
(Magawa, 2012).   
  In the 1980s, governments around the world began to take notice of the HIV/AIDS 
epidemic (Usdin, 2003). Many governments, like Uganda and the U.S., worked to slow 
the spread of HIV/AIDS in their own countries; they also looked beyond their boarders 
and recognized the need to work internationally. In 1985, over 2,000 HIV/AIDS scientists 
from around the world came together to share research and compare notes on AIDS 
(Bliss, 2012). In 1988, the International AIDS society held their first annual conference 
on HIV/AIDS, a conference which continues to be annually held to this day (Bliss, 2012).  
    The 1990s brought increased attention and bilateral funds for HIV/AIDS programming 
and education. By the mid-1990s, $400 million USD in official development assistance 
for the purposes of HIV/AIDS had already been sent to the global south (Nunnenkamp 




scale-up HIV/AIDS programming in the global south. These programmes were becoming 
very political and there were concerns that the influence of donors was preventing a quick 
scaling-up from occurring (Schocken, n.d.; Justice, 1989; Kickbusch, 2000; Farmer, 
2005; Walt et al., 2009).  
  At the 2001, meeting in Abuja, Nigeria, African leaders agreed to the Group of 
Eight’s
3
 idea to create a Global Fund for AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria. The Global 
Fund was created to manage the HIV/AIDS pandemic, ensure effective use of funding, 
and to assist nascent national AIDS programmes (the Global Fund, n.d.; d’Askey, 2004). 
  African leaders stated that they wanted to “take the lead in strengthening current 
successful interventions and developing new and more appropriate policies, practical 
strategies, effective implementation mechanisms and concrete monitoring structures at 
national, regional and continental levels with a view to ensuring adequate and effective 
control of HIV/AIDS” (UN, 2001).  
  In 2001, Kofi Annan, United Nations Secretary- General, created a strategy to fight 
HIV/AIDS (IMF, 2008). That strategy included a comprehensive education campaign: 
“we must give young people the knowledge and power to protect themselves. We need to 
inform, inspire and mobilize them, through an awareness campaign such as the world has 
never seen... once they (young people) know what they need to do, young people must 
have the means to do it. That means they must have support from their families and 
communities, as well as access to voluntary counselling and testing and -- when 
appropriate -- to condom” (Kofi Annan, 2001).   After the creation of the Global Fund 
                                                 
3
 The Group of Eight (G8) is a forum for the heads of state or 
government of the major industrial democracies. The G8 
meets at least annually to discuss international economic 






and until 2008, HIV/AIDS funding had increased six-fold (Avert, 2009).    
PEPFAR 
  In 2003, The President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) was launched. 
Two billion U.S. dollars were allocated from the American Government's budget for 
HIV/AIDS treatment and prevention programmes between the years 2003 to 2008. By 
2007, the U.S. Government accounted for more than forty percent of the global funding to 
HIV/AIDS by governments (Avert, 2009).  
  Controversy struck in 2003, when the American Government announced that of the 
$2 billion allocated to fight HIV/AIDS, thirty-three percent had to be allocated to 
abstinence-before-marriage programming. This mandatory condition greatly limited the 
messaging and education campaign of governments and NGOs.  Critics of this 
programme have argued that the funding has ignored the need for culturally relevant 
HIV/AIDS prevention programming and consequently has put lives at risk (Cohen and 
Tate, 2006).    
  Despite the cautionary feedback from NGO workers and HIV/AIDS activists on the 
need for broader campaign options and concerns over the lack of epidemiological support 
for abstinence-only prevention policies, on July 30
th
 2008, an additional $48 billion 
(USD) was promised for the international fight against HIV/AIDS for years 2009-2013 
through PEPFAR. This second round of funding was attached to the condition that a 
report to Congress must be made if “less than half of prevention funds go to abstinence, 
delay of sexual debut, monogamy, fidelity, and partner reduction” (Avert, 2009).  
  The condition of abstinence and be faithful (A B) and abstinence-only policies 
attached to funding and the increased donor-driven policy agendas are causing much 




behaviour which may lead to an increased risk of contracting HIV. Through the PEPFAR 
programme and the Global Fund (of which the U.S. is the largest donor) the U.S. 
Government is the largest financial contributor to global HIV/AIDS programme funding.  
This has given the Americans control of the prevention agenda.  The effects of their 
influence on these programmes through both multilateral and bilateral foreign aid are 
continuing to be debated.  
U.S.’ Struggle with Prevention 
  Since the early 2000s, the U.S. has been making aggressive changes to its sexual 
health education in schools across the country. The George W. Bush administration 
advocated for abstinence-only (A-only) education to be taught in schools to the exclusion 
of other sexual health prevention. 
  The Bush administration promoted abstinence-only education as a means to delay 
sexual debut
4
 (SIECUS) despite there being no evidence that abstinence-only sexual 
health education lead to delayed sexual debut (McKay, 2001; Silva, 2001; Kirby et al., 
2006; Kirby, 2007). All evidence-based studies have shown comprehensive sexual 
education to be the only program that could achieve a delayed sexual debut (Silva, 2001; 
Kirby et al., 2006; Kirby, 2007).  
  While the debate over abstinence-only sexual health education was happening in 
domestic American policy, international policy was being changed to reflect the 
preference for A-only sexual health education. With the U.S. being the largest donor for 
HIV/AIDS prevention programmes ethical concerns were raised by researchers and 
                                                 
4  The literature coming out of the United States uses the 
term “delayed sexual debut” or “delaying sexual initiation” 
to mean that adolescents have chosen to delay sexual 
intercourse. This does not mean that these adolescents have 




scientists over this new direction (Kirby, 2007; Shambley-Ebron, 2009).  
  If there are no reliable studies showing that A-only education lowers sexual debut, 
thereby decreasing the HIV/AIDS rate, the U.S. should not be able to tie the majority of 
the international HIV/AIDS prevention money to A-only sexual health.
5
 Evidence does 
not always form policy and in the case of A-only education, the politics and theology of 
the U.S. and Uganda are being promoted through policy over evidence-based policy 
making.  
Prevention 
  Prevention, rather than treatment, of HIV/AIDS is the focus of this study.  While 
treatment is recognized to be an important part of combating HIV/AIDS, a thorough and 
comprehensive study of the issues of foreign aid and treatment is too large to be contained 
within this thesis. 
  HIV/AIDS can be transmitted through needles or other exchanges of blood; 
however, it is most often contracted from one person to another through sexual 
intercourse. Sex is a sensitive topic and subject to much taboo.  Different cultures view 
sex and sexual relationships differently.  Cultural practices, customs, and norms play a 
role in sexual exchanges and therefore they play a role in the transmission of HIV. 
Because of the relationship between culture and sex, a one-size-fits-all HIV prevention 
policy may not prove to be the most effective approach.   
  Yet the U.S. is not only emphasising an A-only approach to sexual health education 
through their bilateral aid programs, they are reducing their participation in programmes 
                                                 
5  For more information on the weak link between health 
plans, strategies and evidence, see: M. Foster, Fiscal Space 





that do offer comprehensive programming. The U.S. withdrew much of their funding 
from the Global Fund which had been the primary donor for developing countries on 
HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment. The U.S. was the largest contributor to the Global 
Fund- which takes donations from member organizations. Ninety-five per cent of the 
Global Fund’s operating budget comes from governments. Of that, the U.S. contributed 
35 per cent in 2011
6
. Without the U.S’ donation, the Global Fund is unsure of its financial 
sustainability (The Global Fund, 2012). Even with contributions from the Global Fund, in 
2010/2011 bilateral funding from the U.S. made up 93 per cent of HIV/AIDS directed 
foreign aid to Uganda (Uganda AIDS Commission, 2012). The tying of American 
domestic political preferences, such as abstinence-only, to global health aid by the largest 
donor leaves Uganda with few options to create an HIV/AIDS prevention programme that 
is has been proven effective in Uganda, such as the comprehensive sexual health 
programming used in the 1980s and 1990s.  
  
                                                 
6  Author’s own calculations using data from: The Global 
Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria’s 





















  Uganda was one of the first countries to experience a large HIV/AIDS epidemic. 
The country showed enormous capability in tackling HIV/AIDS early-on despite having 
little international funding for such a campaign (see appendix A1 and A2). Uganda’s 
domestic campaign brought the epidemic from a general population rate of 13.2 per cent 
(ages 15-49) in 1990
7
 to 6.1% by 2002 (UNGASS Report, p.16).   
                                                 
7 According to the World Health Organization (2005) the 
epidemic in Uganda peaked at 18 per cent in 1992. The 
accuracy of both these numbers has been questioned 























































National Prevanlance for ages 15-49
National Prevalence
 




Year Rate of  HIV/AIDS 
prevalence in Uganda 
(percent) 
Rate of HIV/AIDS 
incidence in 
Uganda (number of 
people) 
2000 7.2 N/A 
2001 6.9 N/A 
2002 6.6 N/A 
2003 6.4 N/A 
2004 6.4 N/A 
2005 6.4 N/A 
2006 6.4 N/A 
2007 6.6 115,775 
2008 6.7 119,258 
2009 6.9 124,261 
2010 7.0 128,980 
2011 7.3 145,000 
 
  In 2001, the U.S. created PEPFAR. That same year the Ugandan HIV/AIDS 
epidemic had declined to 6.9 per cent. Two years later in 2003, PEPFAR made its first 
donation to Uganda for HIV (UNAIDS). Uganda’s HIV/AIDS rate was 6.4 per cent. 
Since then Uganda’s HIV/AIDS has stagnated or risen. 
                                                                                                                                                  
pg 13-14; Chin, 2007). 18% is the number that many 
international and United Nations' agencies are using when 
citing the peak of the HIV/AIDS epidemic in Uganda 
(World Health Organization, June 2005. pg 1.). For 
consistency sake this paper will rely on UNAIDS data as it 





  The large infusion of American aid into HIV prevention programmes did influence 
Ugandan prevention policies. However, it is unlikely that funding could have had 
immediate and widespread influence on the rate of the spread of HIV/AIDS. 
  While Uganda was initially a success story in the Sub-Sahara African HIV/AIDS 
epidemic, as of 2007 Uganda's HIV/AIDS prevalence rate has been slightly rising. 
Uganda is among the most severely affected countries in Sub-Saharan Africa today. It is 
estimated that there are close to 1.4 million People Living with HIV/AIDS (PLWHAs) in 
Uganda at the end of 2010 (UNAIDS, Data Analysis) and HIV/AIDS is still considered a 
major impediment to Uganda's development.  
 Uganda is used as an example in much of the literature on Sub-Saharan Africa and 
HIV/AIDS because it has been such a success story and has provided an adequate 
example for those arguing both for and against the American ABC (Abstinence, Be 
Faithful and consistent and correct Condom use
8
) approach to HIV/AIDS prevention.  
  In the literature it is disputed which policies and programmes led to the initial HIV 
rate of decline in Uganda (Cohen and Tate, 2006; Green, 2006; Parkhurst, 2010).  It is 
often claimed, particularly by PEPFAR, that ABC is a successful “homegrown” African 
approach to HIV prevention because it is a model similar to the prevention campaigns run 
by the Ugandan Government in the early 1990s (Hearst, 2007). However, many NGO 
workers and those on the ground in Uganda working on HIV/AIDS prevention during the 
initial decline argue about what role ABC played and how those terms are defined (Green 
et al, 2006).  Avert and Cohen and Tate argue that ABC is not a homegrown Ugandan 
approach and rather an approach implemented because of PEPFAR funding policies 
                                                 
8 Condom use is promoted by the American Government, and many in the international community, 
asonly for those who engage in high-risk sexual activities.  For the purposes of PEPFAR, high risk 




(n.d.G and 2005, respectively).  
Rational for the study 
Even if it were possible to get enough money for our needs from external sources, is this 
what we really want?...Gifts which increase, or act as a catalyst to our own efforts are 
valuable. But gifts which could have the effect of weakening or distorting our own efforts 
should not be accepted until we have asked ourselves a number of questions. 
-  Tanzanian Leadership's Development Manifesto, 1967 (as quoted in Sogge, 2002).  
 
  There has been ample debate on what really happened in Uganda that led to a 
dramatic decline in HIV/AIDS rates. Tumushabe has noted that deaths may account for 
some of the decline (2006). Green (2003), Cohen and Tate (2006), Chin (2007), and 
Parkhurst (2010) argue that the decline has been exaggerated. However, even those who 
argue that the numbers have been inflated still agree that a particularly aggressive decline 
did occur in Uganda and that success is now at risk as rates of HIV begin to climb.  
  Foreign aid should be used to promote and accelerate development (Riddell, 1987). 
However, the literature argues that aid is often tied to policies that are aligned with the 
politics of the donor country. These policies may not follow epidemiological trends and 
may not be relevant to the culture where they are being promoted or implemented (Pisani, 
2010; Chin, 2007). It is unclear how the impact of these politically motivated policies is 
affecting HIV/AIDS prevention work on the ground. Although inconclusive, it has been 
suggested in the literature that policy agendas driven by donor politics could be one of the 
reasons that hinder comprehensive public health action and consequently leads to the 
rising HIV transmission rate in Uganda (Bass, 2005).   
  There is literature available on the grassroots campaign that happened in Uganda 
that may have lead to the initial decline in HIV/AIDS rates (Hogle, J.A., et al., 2002; 




available on the changes to the campaign that occurred as a result of PEPFAR (Epstein, 
2007; Cohen and Tate, 2006; Aidsmap, 2006). However, there is little research available 
on the relationship between U.S. funding, U.S. domestic policy, and changes to the 
Ugandan HIV/AIDS prevention campaign since 2004 when the national prevalence 
stopped declining (Dietrich, 2007). As of 2010, PEPFAR contributed 70 per cent of all 
funding for HIV/AIDS activities in Uganda (Goosby, 2010) and U.S. funding made up 83 
per cent of resources for HIV/AIDS by all external funders (Uganda AIDS Commission, 
2012). At least 33-50 per cent of that funding was tied to the implementation of 
abstinence-only sexual health education programmes which have been proven ineffective 
at changing sexual behaviour. The financial power of the U.S. is influencing Ugandan 
policy makers and NGOs to adopt ineffective prevention programmes. These programmes 
could be affecting Uganda’s rise in HIV/AIDS prevalence rates. Further exploration of 
policy changes and political decision-making that may have lead to the fluctuation in the 
national HIV/AIDS prevalence rate is required.   
Research Statement 
  With early success in decreasing the spread of HIV/AIDS, Uganda demonstrated 
capacity to  slow the epidemic. Uganda was then given increased financial assistance and 
resources from the global community with the intent to further decrease the national 
HIV/AIDS prevalence.  After receiving increased foreign aid targeted at HIV/AIDS, 
Uganda’s HIV/AIDS levelled off and rates began to slightly climb. As increased donor 
funds entered the country, and consequently created multiple approaches to HIV 
prevention, and with it, overwhelming contradictions in health promotion advice,  
HIV/AIDS rate rose. This thesis asks the question:   




PEPFAR contributed to the politicization of  HIV/AIDS prevention programming of 
Uganda, and consequently to poorer incidence rates than that of the past? 
Main argument 
  This thesis argues that funding from PEPFAR has contributed to policy changes in 
the HIV/AIDS prevention programmes of Uganda. Through  use of aid tied to the 
adoption of U.S. polices for HIV/AIDS prevention, many of Uganda’s prevention 
programs are now focused on an abstinence-only model to sexual health education. This 
is also backed by the President of Uganda and the First Lady.  In order to receive foreign 
aid Uganda has foregone a unified, and comprehensive evidence-based prevention 
programme in favour of introducing abstinence-only campaigns into the health promotion 
landscape. Since receiving PEPFAR funding Uganda has been less effective at reducing 
their rate of HIV/AIDS. By diversifying the public health education of the country, and 
by consequently introducing conflicting and conflating public health awareness into the 
country, Uganda’s capacity for reducing HIV/AIDS has been compromised.  
   Findings from the literature conclude that several factors, including comprehensive 
sexual health education campaigns and a reliable supply of condoms are essential to once 
again decrease the rate of HIV/AIDS prevalence.  
The key findings are:   
1. Uganda prevented much of the spread of HIV/AIDS in the late 1980s-early 2000s through 
comprehensive HIV/AIDS sexual health programming which focused on abstinence, 




(“zero grazing” and “just chill”) was familiar to Ugandans and the phrases became 
popularized. The initial effort to curb the climbing of HIV/AIDS rates was inclusive of all 
Ugandans including sex workers
9
 and family planning clinics. The vast availability of free 
condoms was also attributed to the decrease in the rates of HIV/AIDS. “Zero grazing” 
was a homegrown prevention programme and reflected Ugandan culture.  
 The introduction of PEPFAR guidelines on prevention programming did restrict 
Uganda’s original HIV/AIDS campaign. The PEPFAR prevention programme excludes 
high risk groups such as sex workers and intravenous drug users. It limited campaigning 
on messages other than abstinence, and later on messages outside abstinence or 
faithfulness (meaning having sex only with those you are in a committed relationship 
with). PEPFAR’s policies did influence the design of Uganda’s original homegrown “no 
grazing” approach to HIV/AIDS.  
2. Foreign aid from the U.S. is earmarked for particular plans and programs. Many of these 
are in favour of abstinence-only education. Funding from PEPFAR far outweighs the 
international funding available from any other source. Most of the Uganda HIV/AIDS 
prevention programs depend on PEPFAR funding and wish to attract more funding. 
Therefore, they are required to adopt an abstinence-only campaign in order to receive 
international financing.  
3. A campaign promoting abstinence and largely neglecting condoms has been waged by 
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 Men who have sex with men (MSM) are not directly included 
in this thesis when focusing on Uganda because :  
1. it is very difficult to access information on MSM in Uganda 
because of the severe discrimination they suffer.  
2. Unlike the HIV/AIDS experience in North American, 




political and religious leaders in Uganda since 2003. These campaigns are largely 
supported both politically and financially by leaders in the U.S.. In Uganda, new policies 
requiring additional quality testing on condoms has been put in place. This delays market 
entry of condoms and often causes a short supply problem. Without available condoms, 
progressive and comprehensive sexual health education is at risk. If condoms cannot be 
obtained by those wishing to use them because of their short supply, then safe sex cannot 
be practiced and people are either forced into abstinence or they risk contracting HIV.  
Methodology 
  To find books, reports, and journal articles to conduct a literature review on foreign 
aid, HIV/AIDS, PEPFAR and Uganda the method of scoping was employed. Research on 
the political implications and policy agendas attached to foreign aid is widely available, 
as is information on behavioural change policies and their impact on participants. 
However, most of the peer-reviewed literature in journals that I have access to through the 
Saint Mary’s University electronic database, Google scholar, and PubMed are written by 
those living in donor countries.  
  It was important to find a way to include the perspectives of Ugandans in how 
PEPFAR impacted their HIV/AIDS prevention policies. Because fieldwork was not 
included in this study due to time and financial constraints, the methodology of scoping 
had an advantage over methods like systemic review. Scoping allows for a broader 
inclusion of literature as quality is not the major criteria of assessment (Arskey and 
O’Malley, 2005).  
  Scoping also provides a mechanism for rapid mapping of key information such as 




(Arskey and O’Malley, 2005).  
  Books and peer-reviewed journal articles were reviewed on the topic of foreign aid, 
global health, and donor influence. Bibliographies and reference lists were searched to 
find additional sources. Abstracts were read to narrow search results and select studies 
which focused on the relationships between aid donors and aid recipients, and the politics 
of foreign aid.  
  Secondary materials from highly reputable NGOs such as Human Rights Watch and 
AVERT were used in this thesis. An attempt to gather a Ugandan perspective and voice on 
HIV/AIDS policies was accessed through Ugandan newspaper articles. Newspapers were 
also used to understand the influence of Evangelicalism on Uganda’s HIV/AIDS policies 
as there is a gap in the academic literature in this area.  
Critical Theory 
  To understand the relationship between U.S. foreign aid and the HIV/AIDS 
epidemic in Uganda, this thesis applied the meta-theory position of critical theory.  
Critical theory provides an ontological and epistemological perspective that generates 
knowledge while acknowledging power asymmetries and conflicting interests 
(Mikkelsen, 2005). The aim of critical theory is to generate knowledge of the political 
character of social phenomena and to counteract irrational social structures (Mikkelesen, 
2005).  
  Critical theory applies to this thesis because of the unbalanced power relationship 
between PEPFAR (aid donor) and Uganda (aid recipient). I argue that Uganda’s initial 
HIV/AIDS prevention policy followed epidemiological understandings of HIV/AIDS by 
offering comprehensive education (including information on condoms and their 




After 2003, the Government of Uganda changed their HIV/AIDS prevention strategy and 
adopted narrower prevention policies namely:  abstinence-only and ‘faithfulness’ to the 
determinant of condom education and distribution. I argue that this change in policy was 
influenced by pressure from the U.S. and the Evangelical church, which have profound 
financial and political influence in Uganda. Although condoms are still promoted by 
many NGOs in Uganda, the contradictory messages create conflict and confusion in the 
public health landscape of the country. 
  Habermas, a German sociologist and philosopher in the tradition of critical theory, 
warned of the encroachment of political-administrative systems on the “lifeworld”. He 
used the term ‘lifeworld’ to mean the private sphere such as family institutions 
(Habermas, 1984, 1987). For the purposes of this thesis I am considering private (i.e. not 
sex work)
 10
 sexual behaviour as a part of the lifeworld and examining the restriction of 
people’s sexual behaviour – i.e. not being able to access condoms or education on 
condoms - by political-administrative system through communicative action (mass 
communication institutions).         
 In some of Habermas’ later writings, namely Political Communication in Media 
Society: Does Democracy Still Enjoy an Epistemic Dimension, Habermas describes how 
the media and political figures have significant power to shape ‘public opinion’, but that 
some of that “power is constrained... by the reflexivity of a public sphere that allows all 
participants to reconsider what they perceive as public opinion” (2006, emphasis in italics 
is original).  He argues that people can use the public sphere to participate in opinion 
shaping particularly through open and democratic media (Habermas, 2006).  This thesis 
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 I am not considering sex work as part of the lifeworld as it is as system rooted in economic transactions 




looks to the Ugandan media for that public participation and voice of Ugandans. Primary 
sources of information that were authored by Ugandans or included their perspective on 
PEPFAR’s influence and HIV/AIDS policy were very limited and difficult to acquire. I 
have attempted to include the perspective of some Ugandans through Ugandan newspaper 
articles as one of the secondary sources of research material.           
 I have applied Habermas’ critical theory framework to this thesis by examining the 
relationship between PEPFAR, Uganda’s political administration, and the influence they 
have on the HIV/AIDS prevention policies of Uganda.  
Justification for the study 
  Current data suggest a significant correlation between HIV/AIDS prevention policy 
and program implementation and the HIV/AIDS infection rate in the communities in 
which they are implemented. Policies and programmes which are broadly implemented, 
government supported, encompass several different approaches, use a variety of messages 
and are implemented early in the epidemic have a significant impact on the rate that 
HIV/AIDS spreads in a community versus those policies which do not approach 
prevention programming with these fundamentals or are narrow in scope (Kirby, 2007; 
Barnett and Parkhurst, 2005; Cohen and Tate, 2006; Parkhurst and Lush, 2004).  
  The foreign transaction whether in cash or in-kind and the expertise provided by 
international organizations and overseas governments often have policy and programme 
requirements attached. These requirements can lead to changes in a recipient country’s 
polices and programming.  
  This thesis conducted a thorough scope of the literature available on U.S. aid and its 




donor policies on aid recipient countries, Uganda’s HIV/AIDS prevention policies were 
examined before and after receiving substantial funding through PEPRFAR. For this 
thesis I studied the relationship between Uganda and the U.S. and identified the structures 
of power dynamics that exist between them. The case study I used is the adoption of the 
U.S.` abstinence-only sexual health programme by Uganda. By examining the 
mechanisms of political agendas and foreign aid I analysed the interplay between the U.S. 
and Uganda during the HIV/AIDS epidemic.  
  Uganda is not the only country to have accepted PEPFAR funding with abstinence-
only programming restrictions attached. Many countries in the Global South received 
PEPFAR funding. However, there were several reasons why Uganda was chosen. Firstly, 
Uganda was one of the first countries to acknowledge HIV/AIDS was in their country and 
to begin prevention programming to halt its spread (WHO, n.d.). The initial response time 
by Uganda is important because it provided over a decade of research on the effects of a 
homegrown Ugandan HIV/AIDS prevention programme (1989-2002).
11
 Secondly, 
Uganda was one of the first countries to establish HIV/AIDS testing at antenatal and 
Sexually Transmitted Infection (STI) sites.
12
 These sites have been recording rates of 
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 Uganda did receive funding from the Global Fund and other 
multilateral and bilateral organizations before PEPFAR 
funding became available. But funding from other sources 
did not attach requirements of abstinence-only education 
and multiple studies report that the “no grazing” campaign 
of 1989-2002 was a Ugandan homegrown response.  
12
 Pisani (2008) questions the reliability of HIV/AIDS rates 
coming out of the global south for two reasons. The first, 
she suggests, is that HIV/AIDS rates have been exaggerated 
to attract more international funding (2008). The second is 
that most, if not all, of the patients at antenatal and STI 
clinics are having sexual intercourse and she warns that you 
cannot generalize an HIV/AIDS epidemic to the wider 
public when you are only testing your sexually active 
population (2008).  However, because the HIV/AIDS rate is 




HIV/AIDS since the early 1990s (WHO, n.d.). This gives this thesis an ability to compare 
HIV/AIDS infection rates before and after PEPFAR interventions. Very few, if any other, 
countries in the Global South have been recording HIV/AIDS rates for as long as Uganda 
(Commonwealth Regional Health Community Secretariat, 2002).  Thirdly, Uganda was 
chosen because it has received PEPFAR funding that was tied to the implementation of 
abstinence-only prevention education and this made it possible to study the impact of 
PEPFAR tied funds (PEPFAR, 2003).  Lastly, Uganda was chosen because it has been 
extensively written about and studied. The large volume of available research meant that 
such a study was within the scope of a Master’s thesis. 
  It would have been interesting to compare Uganda with other Global South 
countries that are recipients of PEPFAR funding. However, literature on the homegrown 
prevention programmes of these countries is very limited. This is often the case because 
countries did not act quickly to create their own internal response to their HIV/AIDS 
epidemic (“History of HIV & AIDS in Africa”, n.d.). This made comparing countries 
responses before and after receiving PEPFAR funding more challenging and is perhaps 
outside the scope of a Master’s thesis as much more preliminary  and field research would 
be required to  piece together countries’ initial responses to HIV/AIDS . By focusing this 
research on one country, I could provide a more in-depth analysis of Uganda’s response to 
the epidemic before and during their reception of PEPFAR funding.  
  This thesis scoped secondary sources of published literature on HIV/AIDS in 
Uganda and sexual health information, education, and communication. A review of the 
literature on foreign aid for international health, American foreign aid policies, and 
                                                                                                                                                  
literature by UNAIDS, WHO and others, I have adopted 




international HIV/AIDS prevention efforts was completed. Additionally this thesis 
examined relevant government documents (Ugandan and American), reports from 
Uganda’s Ministry of Health, PEPFAR policy documents and bilateral country reports, 
PEPFAR guidelines and policies, HIV/AIDS prevention evaluation reports, newspaper 
articles (both Ugandan and American), political speech transcripts, academic journals, 
and books.  
  Researchers have studied the effectiveness of Uganda’s initial “no grazing” 
campaign to prevent the spread of HIV/AIDS. Other research has been conducted on the 
American-style of abstinence-only prevention programs. However, looking at why 
Uganda has switched from a “no grazing” campaign to an A-only campaign is a relatively 
new area of research. This study provides a critical piece in the understanding of how 
donor governments can impact the policies and programmes of successful homegrown 
approaches in developing countries. 
  This thesis is largely qualitative; however, quantitative material was used to 
illustrate the fluctuation in the HIV/AIDS epidemic in Uganda and to correlate those 
numbers with the amount of foreign aid sent from the U.S. to Uganda. 
Limitations of this study 
  The most significant limitation to this research is that in the 1980s the methods of 
prevention and the weight given to each method may have differed throughout the 
country. This is likely the result of both a civil war (until 1986) and the urgency to stop 
the HIV/AIDS epidemic which was a new virus at the time. Documenting the initial 
responses to HIV/AIDS was likely not high on the government’s priority list. As a result 
monitoring of the initial HIV/AIDS prevention campaign called “zero grazing” was 




  Data on rates of HIV/AIDS in Uganda from the 1980s and early 1990s can be 
unreliable and unavailable. Some data is available from antenatal clinics was collected 
and reported in varying settings using various methods and this could have an impact on 
their results (Black and White, 2003; Tumushabe, 2006). AIDS surveillance developed 
and improved substantially between the 1980s-2000s. In the 1990s, Uganda began a door-
to-door testing campaign which offered Ugandans free HIV/AID testing and counselling 
without them having to travel to clinics, hospitals or public testing locations (Mukisa, 
2013). HIV/AIDS testing also improved from blood tests at clinics to saliva tests with 
near instant results (authors own experience working in a health clinic in Misufini, 
Kenya). 
  I have attempted to find data that is the most reliable, accurate, and comprehensive. 
Whenever possible, I have tried to use only one source for HIV/AIDS rates (prevalence 
and incidence) so as to mitigate the impact of various HIV/AIDS rate collection methods. 
I have also chosen to use UNAIDS datasets as they are most often referred to in the 
literature and this keeps my research consistent with the literature I am using. The greatest 
impact of various methods of collecting HIV/AIDS rates could put question to how much 
impact A, B, and C played on Ugandans in the initial decline.  
Required information 
  Information was obtained through a variety of secondary sources. To answer 
Uganda’s relationship with foreign aid for HIV/AIDS prevention programming, it was 
necessary to complete a historical review of Uganda’s original homegrown HIV/AIDS 
prevention programming called “zero grazing”. That information needed to be compared 




what, if any, changes were made.  Further research into the policies of PEPFAR needed to 
be completed to understand the changes and restrictions being places on recipient 
countries. To understand what impact new policies could have on Uganda, an analysis of 
the evidence behind these changes (such as the outcome of abstinence-only sexual health 
education) was conducted.  
Data Collection Techniques 
  To collect the data required for this thesis the scoping method was utilized.  Scoping 
was used to find books, case studies, NGO and government reports, and newspaper 
articles on foreign aid, HIV/AIDS prevention techniques, and behavioural change 
programmes. Scoping was also used to discover PEPFAR reports and evaluations. Lastly, 
scoping was employed to gather Ugandan’s perspectives on the changes to sexual health 
education through online newspaper articles and NGO reports.                                                                                                     
  After an initial review of the literature, it became apparent that research from the 
Global North dominates the academic material especially that which is found in peer-
reviewed journals on sexual health behavioural change. I needed to research both the 
impact of sexual behaviour change programs in the U.S. and in Uganda to understand the 
changes made to HIV/AIDS prevention from the perspective of those inside the country 
who experienced programming changes firsthand. Whenever possible, sources from 
Uganda were used, such as Ugandan Ministry of Health reports and Ugandan 
governmental operational plans. The need for Ugandan specific research on sexual health 
behavioural change programmes prompted a wider search for research. It was decided 
that the adoption of a scoping methodology would allow for rapid mapping of key 




suggested by Arskey and O’Malley (2005). This method allowed the inclusion of 
secondary materials from highly reputable NGOs such as Human Rights Watch and 
AVERT and Ugandan newspaper articles.   
  The time period under investigation follows the epidemiological trend in Uganda 
(early-1980s to present day) and empirical data (1990s-2011). This time period is 
combined with on-going reviews of the literature to draw historically informed lessons 
about political context for future policy development.  
  Many of the online Ugandan newspaper sites such as the Monitor and New Vision 
do not store material past a certain number of years (2006 for the Monitor and 2000 for 
New Vision). Occasionally articles had pay walls preventing access to archived material. 
For these reasons, I did not need to set and apply a range of dates to the information I 
gathered (as suggested by Askery and O’Malley, 2005). Instead I was limited by dates 
imposed on the research through the news websites.  
  At the writing stage of this thesis it became evident that the American and Ugandan 
Evangelical movement was having a strong influence on the policies and programmes of 
PEPFAR. After conducting an initial scope of the available literature, few peer-reviewed 
academic papers were found. The terms “Evangelical HIV/AIDS Uganda” were entered 
into the Saint Mary’s University library database and 19 results were found. Of those only 
7 results contained all 3 keywords. One of these studies was removed because its full text 
was not available. After reading the remaining 6 articles, 4 others were removed because 
they were not the best fit to assist with answering the research question. Askery and 
O’Malley suggest that in cases “where an area is complex or has not been reviewed 
comprehensively before” the researcher should conduct a scoping study (2005, 5). Askery 




searching through both of the relevant articles references two additional relevant sources 
were discovered and a saturation point was reached were no new relevant literature was 
found.  
  I did not feel that four studies was enough to support a discussion on the evangelical 
influence over the politics and policies of HIV/AIDS prevention programming in Uganda, 
so additional electronic databases were used. Through Google scholar I further refined my 
search query and 17 results were shown and of those an additional 4 were included in this 
thesis.  
  This same method of scoping was then completed with 12 other search queries 
including: “foreign aid policy and global health donor influence”, “American foreign aid 
policy and global health donor influence”, “PEPFAR”, “PEPFAR Prevention”, “PEPFAR 
HIV/AIDS Uganda Prevention”, “international foreign aid donor HIV/AIDS”,  “school 
based sexual health education behavioural change United States Uganda”,  “Evangelical 
HIV/AIDS Uganda prevention”,  “evangelicals international development Africa”,  “Janet 
Museveni”, “Janet Museveni HIV/AIDS”, and “Janet Museveni abstinence” (see 
appendix 3 for full list of search terms, databases,  refining terms, and result). Each time I 
would narrow the results by finding key words in titles or abstracts to eliminate until the 
search was narrowed to a more manageable number of articles.  
  The decision of which books or articles to borrow, download or obtain through 
interlibrary loan was made after reading titles and abstracts to determine ‘best fit’, as  
recommended by Askery and O’Malley (2005).  
  Askery and O’Malley suggested that when conducting research through the method 
of scoping, an Information Officer be employed to help keep track of searches, dates, and 




such I did my best to keep track of searches, dates, and results (see appendix 3).  
   In addition to scoping, content analysis was performed on PEPFAR funding 
documents and Ugandan country profile documents to find patterns showing preference 
for abstinence-only or comprehensive sexual health programming (see appendix 2). To 
analyse what, if any, changes had been made to Uganda’s successful homegrown 
prevention approach to HIV/AIDS, analysis of Uganda’s Ministry of Health Operational 
Plans and Guidelines was conducted. Any policy changes noted were then compared with 
PEPFAR funding guidelines. This was used to help determine if PEPFAR’s funding 
criteria could have influenced Uganda’s HIV/AIDS prevention programming.  
  Through the collection of government documents I was able to conduct research on 
PEPFAR policies and funding restrictions. Analysing the text allowed me to extract what 
was included and what was excluded from prevention programming and funding policies 
(such as condom distribution).  
  Government documents also allowed me to retrieve information on HIV/AIDS 
statistics—both People Living With HIV/AIDS (PLWHA) and newly acquired infections. 
The use of government documents made it possible to research how much prevention 
funding was available to Uganda from multiple sources including the U.S. U.S. 
government documents allowed me to follow the money from PEPFAR to Uganda and 
analyse who was receiving the money in Uganda to implement sexual health prevention 
programming. Analyzing the prevention policies of PEPFAR donation recipients in 
Uganda reveals the distribution of PEPFAR funds to abstinence-only or comprehensive 






  The documents used in this thesis include: both aid donor and aid recipient 
government reports and policies, books, peer-reviewed journal articles, PEPFAR funding 





Chapter 2: Literature Review 
  A study of foreign aid and the role aid plays in both health and development is 
necessary to understand the interaction between aid donors and recipients. Drawing upon 
the literature on foreign aid and development, this chapter will examine the role of aid 
donors and recipients and the asymmetric power relation that gives donors the ability to 
direct recipients HIV/AIDS prevention policies.  
   Following a review on foreign aid, part two of this chapter will provide an 
understanding of the debate on the prevention of HIV/AIDS. The literature examines 
foreign aid and its role in international health, the power relations between foreign aid 
donors and recipients, foreign aid and U.S. interests, foreign aid and HIV/AIDS, and 
foreign aid and Uganda. All of these areas help establish a better understanding of historic 
and current relations between foreign aid donors and foreign aid recipients with an 
emphasis on health and HIV/AIDS. This allows for better understanding of the 
relationship between PEPFAR and Uganda in the case of HIV/AIDS prevention.  
  To define foreign aid this thesis will be using Official Development Assistance
13
 
which is defined by the OECD as: grants or loans to developing countries and territories 
and to multilateral agencies which are: (a) undertaken by the official sector (b) with 
promotion of economic development and welfare as the main objective; (c) at 
                                                 
13    David Sogge, 2002 claims that Official Development 
Assistance is a condescending term used when aid is given to 
low-income countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America. The 
same aid is termed 'official aid' when it is given to Eastern 
Europe, the ex-Soviet Union, and other 'transitioning' countries 
(27). The use of the term 'official development assistance' in 
this paper is not meant to cause offense. This paper has adapted 
the language of the UN, OECD, World Bank, and USAID for 
the purposes of clarity and data collection. As the author, I 
apologize if the use of ODA is offensive to some. When 





concessional financial terms (if a loan, having a grant element of at least 25 per cent). In 
addition to financial flows, technical co-operation is included in aid. According to the 
report International Assistance for HIV/AIDS in the Development World: Taking Stock of 
the G8, Other Donor Governments, and the European Commission, published by 
UNAIDS, official assistance includes grants and loans both in currency and in-kind.
14
 
  It needs to be noted that some of the research sources used in this thesis do not 
specify if they include in-kind donations or how they determine the value of in-kind 
assistance in ODA. PEPFAR does offer in-kind donations, especially as a part of their 
public-private partnership program. However, there is an inconsistency in reporting in-
kind donations and many non-governmental organizations and some government papers 
do not include in-kind donations. In this thesis, every measure possible is taken to alert 
the reader when foreign aid numbers do not include in-kind assistance or when it is 
unclear as to whether the original source included both currency and in-kind assistance in 
their valuations of aid. 
Foreign Aid and Development- Who gets to decide 
  The practice of giving aid to developing countries as a form of financial or in-kind 
assistance has always been controversial. Some authors believe donor countries use aid to 
wield power and influence over developing countries (Teresa Hayter, 1971; Raymond 
Hopkins, 2000; Tina Wallace et al., 2006; Stephen Browne, 2006; Paul Collier, 2007; 
William Easterly, 2007; and Glennie, 2008) . These authors see a need to reduce the 
dependency of developing countries on foreign aid and to scale back many of the policies, 
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programmes, and donor involvement. With a radical shift in the politics of aid, these 
authors see aid as having the potential to play a positive role (Teresa Hayter, 1971; 
Raymond Hopkins, 2000; Tina Wallace et al., 2006; Stephen Browne, 2006; Paul Collier, 
2007; William Easterly, 2007; and Glennie, 2008). 
  Moyo is one of the few authors who call for an ending of all aid except during 
humanitarian crisis such as the often cited Tsunami of 2004 or during times of global 
epidemics such as the global experience with HIV/AIDS (2010).  Sachs argues that aid is 
still worthwhile to recipient countries and plays an important role in global poverty 
alleviation (2005). While Lancaster sees aid as not having a single purpose, but rather one 
that has continually evolved and must be re-examined by each governing party (2007).  
   Hayter (1971), Hopkins (2000), and Hudson and Goulet (1971) see aid as more 
beneficial to donor countries than to developing ones. They all use the U.S. as their 
example of a country that is using foreign aid to serve political interests of their own 
rather than to fulfil the interests or needs of recipient countries. Hayter sees foreign aid as 
a form of imperialism (1971). She notes that countries of interest to the U.S. receive 
flexible financial aid, whereas countries of less importance to the U.S. receive aid tied to 
strict conditions and policies (1971). Hopkins uses the period of the cold war to show that 
the U.S. gives money to the countries it is strategically aligned with (2000). Hayter calls 
for a revolution in aid, but believes that aid policies will likely remain with the status quo 
because the U.S. is too powerful (1971).
15
 Hudson and Goulet show that the U.S. prefers 
bilateral relationships with recipient countries because it achieves U.S. self-interest. They 
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 Although Hayter’s Aid as Imperialism is quite dated now, I 
believe it is important to include her assessment of the U.S.’ 
power and influence because it shows that the U.S. has held 





find that the U.S. only supports multilateral organizations when they promote U.S. 
policies. Hudson and Goulet suggest that more multilateral aid projects may further assist 
recipient countries (1971).  
  Gordenker sees international organizations as having conscious and subconscious 
influence on recipient countries which Gordenker argues leads recipients to tailor 
programming to attract increased aid rather than designing programmes for the best 
outcome in each recipient country (1976). Gordenker could not find any “rational means” 
for how the governments of donor countries select recipient countries. He writes that “the 
decisions therefore can be placed in the category of political, rather than technical, 
choices” (1976, 92). Like Hayter (1971), Gordenker sees aid establishing a dependent 
relationship that leads to neocolonialism (1976).  
  Riddell argues that aid can play an important role in accelerating development but it 
cannot create development (2004). He cautions developing countries to not become 
dependent on aid and he sees aid as most favourable to donor countries and their interests 
(2004 and 1996). He argues that aid's purpose and aid's motives should not be confused 
(1996). Riddell calls for more research on how aid could be effective, more unity in donor 
objectives for aid and for aid to focus on where it is required rather than on how much 
should be given
16
 or to whom (2004 and 1996).  
  Wallace, Borenstein and Chapman write about the aid chain (2006). They sees aid 
as having potential to help developing countries grow, but only if it is locally managed, 
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needs of the countries' are and to give an amount 





responsive to the needs of the recipient community, and allows for local innovation and 
creativity (2006). Wallace et al., see power flowing from North to South with no feedback 
loop for the South to be involved in the decision making. They argue that for 
development to occur the system as-is needs to be evaluated and decision making power 
needs to be re-distributed to the recipients, practitioners, and local communities (Wallace 
et al., 2006). As a result, Wallace et al., see aid as weakening and potentially undermining 
local democracy and decision making (2006).  
  Not everyone agrees that aid can simply be reformed. Moyo sees aid as harmful to 
developing countries. She argues that aid is given for the benefit of donor countries
17
 and 
that development experts know aid is “crap, but it sells the t-shirts” (2009). For recipients, 
aid has facilitated corruption, created bloated governments and is the reason for 
development stagnation and regression (2009). Although Moyo sees a need for some aid 
now, particularly in the case of health epidemics, Moyo's ultimate hope is that aid “will 
dwindle to zero” (2009).  
  Although not differing from Moyo's concentration on the negative impact that aid 
has made, other researchers such as Browne (2006) and Kankwenda (2005) see little or 
no positive impact made by foreign aid on the development objectives of recipient 
countries. Instead aid had been used by donor countries for donors' commercial and 
political advantage (Hjerlhom & Wgute, 2000 as quoted in Browne, 2006. p. 22.; 
Kakwenda in Erero, 2004). Kankwenda sees foreign aid as a distraction from the “real 
task of development” (Erero, 2004). 
                                                 





  Easterly sees a need to transform development agencies. He is critical of the way 
donor governments and agencies operate because they spend their energy on fundraising 
and pleasing their donors rather than focusing on how and where the money for 
development is spent (2002). He sees donors as often hindering development (2007). He 
claims donors want to plant their country’s flag on each development initiative and this 
prevents collaborative work (2002).  He warns that aid agencies are not critical of 
themselves or others because they fear that will give a bad name to all of aid (2002). 
Easterly reminds his readers that those working for aid agencies in their country may not 
have an incentive to see their country come out of poverty, and he feels like this is another 
hindrance to development (2002).  Easterly offers a solution to change the agencies' role 
from what he calls “planners” into “searchers” (2007). He defines searchers as people and 
organizations that find new ways to assist developing countries (2007). Although 
commonly cited as an aid critic, Easterly does note that aid has played a positive role in 
some areas of development, notably education and health (Sachs, 2006). 
  Collier places the blame for a lack of development on the feet of developing 
countries' leaders. He argues that recipients' governance has been inappropriate and calls 
on donor governments to reinstate aggressive policy programmes that focus on aid, trade, 
security, and governance reform (2007). Unlike Moyo (2009), Collier argues that aid has 
increased the economic growth of the bottom billion (2007). Therefore, Collier sees aid as 
part of the solution, but heavily tied aid needs to be offered to ensure appropriate 
governance (2007).  
  Glennie, like Collier, calls for an adjustment of aid policies and not the abolishing 




and can cause more harm than good (2008). He suggests that instead of setting targets for 
how much aid donor countries give, we should set targets for developing countries to get 
off aid dependency and decrease their aid income (2008).  
  Dollar and Pritchett of the World Bank write that development with aid is possible 
as long as aid is given to “good governments” (1998). Dollar and Pritchett do raise 
concern with donors’ self-interest (1998). Donors’ tie aid to ensure their own products are 
purchased (1998). According to Dollar and Prichett tied aid reduces the value of aid by 
twenty-five per cent because donor prices or transportation fees may be higher than they 
could access if they were able to shop around with their aid money (1998). Additionally, 
Dollar and Prichett have concern with the political and security interests of donors (1998). 
They argue that these interests push aid to countries that are not necessarily in most need 
of aid, but rather, are of interest to donor countries (1998).  They see the motivation to 
give foreign aid as a combination of economic and political self-interest along with some 
degree of altruism (1998).  
   Walt et al., see aid as an opportunity for donor countries to have power and control. 
They look at the relationship between donors, recipients and NGOs and find that the 
power grab by donor countries often manifests itself by going through NGOs rather than 
official government channels (1999). Donor countries avoided aid coordination with 
recipient countries and their ministries because they found them too time consuming, with 
too much ceremony involved, too many participants which made decision making 
ineffective, sometimes recipient countries have too little expertise in particular areas, and 
finally, Walt et al., found that many donors were wary of becoming subjected to too much 




countries to implement the policies they desire, rather than cooperating with recipient 
countries (1999).  
  Looking more at donor control in HIV/AIDS programming, Woods finds that the 
U.S. prefers bilateral to multilateral funding so it can retain control over program 
development on the ground (2005). Although several multilateral organizations have been 
established (many even by the U.S.) including the Global Fund, Woods argues that the 
Bush administration in particular is more interested in controlling foreign aid and 
allocating it strategically (2005). Woods suggests that some of this strategic expenditure 
of aid is driven by security interests to the U.S. and not on recipients needs (2005). Woods 
sees the additional delivery mechanisms and lack of coordination as challenges to aid’s 
effectiveness (2005).  
  Although previously opposed to foreign aid (1992, as mentioned by Wallace et al. 
2006. p. 24), in his book, The End of Poverty: Economic Possibilities for our Time 
(2005), Sachs changes his view and argues in favour of continuing foreign aid. He 
recommends that donor countries drop the debt of recipient countries and increase their 
foreign aid programmes to the 0.7 per cent of GDP which was agreed to at the Monterrey 
Consensus (2005). Sachs sees aid as a way to fight terrorism, free countries and their 
people from the trap of poverty, and improve global health (2005). He sees a strong role 
for both bilateral and multilateral aid programs (2005).  
  All of the authors argue that aid is complex and the purposes and intent of aid are 
often even more complicated and varied. Lancaster suggests the purpose of giving aid 




  Foreign aid establishes a neo-colonial relationship whereby the recipient (usually a 
country in the global south) is dependent upon the donor country (often a country in the 
global north). Through the giving or lending of financial aid the donor country 




  In relation to aid spent specifically on HIV/AIDS, donors want more control over 
the spending and allocation despite the needs or best interests of the recipient country 
(Woods, 2009).  
U.S. and Foreign Aid 
  As a percentage of Gross National Income, the U.S. gives a modest 0.21 per cent in 
foreign aid, but in net official development assistance disbursements the U.S. is the 
largest international donor (OECD, 2010). Being the largest donor of international aid, 
changes in U.S. foreign aid policy has the potential to greatly impact recipient countries 
and multilateral agencies. This next section will review the motives of the U.S. foreign 
aid programmes and the political strategy behind their policies as suggested through the 
literature.  
  Goldwin et al, wrote that American aid started as an emergency relief program 
providing food, shelter and clothing to areas devastated by World War II (1965). Aid 
quickly became a political tool when American interests were threatened by a communist 
takeover and Europe needed to rebuild to become a lucrative trading partner with the U.S. 
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foreign trade). But sometimes, as Wallace et al, suggested, 






(Goldwin et al., 1965). The first goal of the 1950 Point Four Program was to create 
markets for the U.S. (USAID, n.d.). In 1964, McNamara said the “foreign aid 
program...has now become the most critical element of our overall national security 
effort...” (Hudson, and Goulet, 1971). And in the post 9-11 world USAID claims that 
foreign aid has:  
the same overarching goals that President Kennedy outlined 50 years ago – furthering 
America's foreign policy interests in expanding democracy and free markets while also 
extending a helping hand to people struggling to make a better life, recover from a 
disaster or striving to live in a free and democratic country. It is this caring that stands as 
a hallmark of the United States around the world. (USAID, n.d.) 
  The U.S.'s government can be found explaining and rationalizing aid to their 
citizens by arguing two things, either: it is the moral thing for them to do, or, it is good 
economics because it will open new trading routes. However, while USAID admits there 
is some self-interest to aid, they continue to highlight the former moral and humanitarian 
need to give aid. The literature debates the merits of American foreign aid programmes 
and often concludes that aid is mostly designed for the benefit of America.  
  Hudson and Goulet (1971) and Walt et al. (1999) show that foreign aid is designed 
for donors and not recipients. Hudson and Goulet look at foreign aid using a political 
economy framework. They suggest that foreign aid has been designed to implement the 
donors' political policies rather than considering the needs and capabilities of recipient 
countries (1971). They point to the U.S. in particular for wanting countries to become 
dependent on foreign aid rather than on their home market (1971). Using several points in 
history when the U.S. withdrew from multilateral funding because they were not 
personally benefiting, Hudson and Goulet suggest that the U.S. prefers bilateral 




  With a similar point-of-view on the U.S.’ interests and foreign aid, Gill Walt et al. 
(1999) look specifically at USAID's funding of family planning activities in Bangladesh 
and the U.S.' desire- or lack thereof- to coordinate funding with other donors. Walt et al. 
conclude that despite research showing that recipient-led programmes are better 
implemented, USAID and other external funders would rather pursue their own agenda 
than try to coordinate and compromise (1999). This leaves ministries of health in a weak 
and dependent position vis-a-vis the donors (1999).  
  Kolko adds a unique perspective to the U.S.' interests in aid by focusing on foreign 
trade opportunities (1988). He argues that the U.S. was upset that it did not have a colony 
in Africa because they were not able to get products from the continent directly and 
instead needed to buy through a colonizer (Kolko, 1988). The U.S. saw aid as an 
opportunity to better relations between themselves, Europe, and Africa and gain access to 
raw materials (Kolko, 1988). He argues the U.S. foray into foreign aid was for the 
purpose of creating a trading relationship rather than focusing on the best development 
strategy for newly independent African countries (Kolko, 1988). Kolko uses the example 
of the U.S. staying out of concerns over mistreatment and racism (such as during South 
Africa's apartheid) because they wanted to preserve their trading relationships (1988).  
  More recently, Rick Travis wrote “Problems, Politics, and Policy Streams: A 
Reconsideration of U.S. Foreign Aid Behaviour Toward Africa” (2010). Travis explores 
the relationship between internal American politics and their foreign aid programs and 
policies. Instead of foreign aid being distributed based on recipient need, Travis finds that 
U.S. aid policies change as different parties come into power (2010). This leaves 




funding to each party, rather than to concentrate on funding effective programmes or 
policies. 
  Farmer, a physician, activist, Deputy Special Envoy for Haiti from 2009 to 2012, 
and Special Adviser for Community-based Medicine and Lessons from Haiti to United 
Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon writes about the relationship between Haiti and 
American foreign aid (2005). Farmer uses the example of U.S. money going to Haiti to 
fund President Duvalier and his rebel groups, but when President Aristide won his first 
election with ninety-three per cent of the vote, no aid went to Haiti from the U.S. and 
instead a trade embargo was implemented (2005). Farmer argues that the U.S. was 
looking out for their interests over the needs of Haitians and achieved this through aid and 
military power (2005).  
  Attaran and Sachs write that the American government has largely disappeared 
from the foreign aid scene and in their place American philanthropists and non-profit 
groups have implemented aid programmes (2001). Sachs believes the retreat on “soft 
stuff” (aid) is in favour of “hard stuff” (military) to create stability and security overseas 
and for themselves (Attaran and Sachs, 2001; Sachs 2006 (2)). He argues that the neglect 
of foreign aid has been bipartisan as both the Clinton and Bush Administration spent $3 
billion or less on aid a year, while spending hundreds of billions of dollars ($550 million 
during George W. Bush's administration) on military (Sachs, 2006).  
  The literature is strongly suggests that U.S. national interest are the primary 
objective of the country’s foreign aid programs. The U.S. government does not deny that 




disconnect between the emphasis placed upon assisting others in the U.S. government's 
rhetoric and the implementation of self-interested policies as seen in the literature.
19
 
Foreign Aid and Health 
  Health is an important indicator of how a country is developing. Authors, such as 
Burnside and Dollar, use health measurements because it provides “indirect evidence of 
whether the benefits of development are reaching the broad mass of the population” 
(1998, 2).
20
 Improving health in a country can be a significant sign of development.  
  Recipient countries need to be careful when using foreign aid to improve their 
health services. Oftentimes recipient countries become dependent on foreign aid and this 
affects their health care services and delivery. Health care funded by donor countries is 
focused on the desires and political theories of the Global North and may not be culturally 
appropriate for the recipient. 
  Politics in foreign aid is not new. The first known comprehensive public health 
treatise, A System of Complete Medical Police, was written in 1779. Johann Peter Frank, 
author of the treatise, was writing during the time of the enlightenment and saw a need for 
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better public hygiene and sanitation not for moral reasons, but rather in order to create a 
healthier labour force for capitalist production (Birn et al., 2009).  
  As Europe increased its interest and investment in production overseas, concerns 
over public hygiene and healthcare in the colonies arose. International healthcare was first 
implemented to ensure the safety of foreign militaries (De Campos, 1988) and European 
settlers and to improve productivity of local workers in the colonies (Birn et al, 2009, 41- 
quoted MacLeod and Lewis, 1998; Bashford, 2004).  
  Today global health has many more players, international organizations, NGOs, 
multilateral and bilateral agencies are now involved in the delivery of health care 
services. Bodies such as the World Health Organization, UN agencies like UNAIDS, and 
the Global Fund for HIV/AIDS, Malaria and Tuberculosis have been founded to oversee 
and at times coordinate international health programming.     
 Crane and Dusenberry (2004) offer the most controversial and recent examples of U.S. 
interests being promoted overseas through health policy, the Mexico City Policy.
21
 They 
argue that in Kenya, the American position on international abortion influenced the 
Kenyan government to create their own anti-abortion law in hope that doing so they 
would attract more U.S. financial assistance (Crane and Dunsenberry, 2004). The need or 
desire for foreign aid by recipient countries can be so great that laws and policies are 
changed to align themselves with the policies and laws of donors. One could argue that 
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(by making abortions available or simply educating women 




the health interests of Kenyans and in particular Kenyan woman came secondary to 
attracting more foreign aid.
22
  
  Dollar and Pritchett (1998), and Green (2003) would find the changes made by the 
Kenyan government concerning and yet predictable. They looked at health programmes 
in aid recipient countries and found that many of the implemented programmes were 
designed by and for donors who may not have understood the culture of the recipient 
country (Dollar and Pritchett, 1998; Green, 2003). As such, these authors argue that many 
aid programmes are culturally inappropriate and at times harmful (1998 and 2003).  
  Moyo (2010) and Navarro (1974) challenge modernisation in health because 
“underdevelopment” is not due to the scarcity of values, capital or technology, but rather, 
it is due to the inappropriate application of donor finances relative to local needs. Much of 
the foreign aid for health is spent on adapting the Global South to the North’s biomedical 
approach to health care (heavily weighted on technology) (Birn et al, 2009). Navarro 
argues that a high-tech health care model is inappropriate in much of the Global South 
and results in less health care for patients and a dependency on foreign aid for the country 
(Birn et al,. 2009).   
   Justice (1986), De Campos (1998), and Dodd et al., (2007) argue that the Global 
North is interested in the health of people living in the Global South out of concern for 
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their own national security interests.
23
  They establish a link between donor countries' 
interest in international health and global pandemics. Justice and De Campos argue that 
this has been happening since the 1940s, starting with smallpox and malaria (1986 and 
1998, respectively). Today both HIV/AIDS and influenza pandemics bring the 




  Glennie argues that foreign aid is most effective when given for the purposes of 
improving health. He suggests this is because foreign aid for healthcare often bypasses 
the government and is given directly to the service provider or service providing agency 
(2008). When foreign aid is given to the government for the purposes of health, Dollar 
and Pritchett suggest that it is not well used (1998). Dollar and Pritchett argue that sector 
specific aid is fungible- meaning if a donor gives aid to a particular sector it will simply 
replace current government expenditure- which will get spent elsewhere- thereby not 
increasing the money to that sector (1998). For this reason, Dollar and Prichett argue in 
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One of the reasons why developed countries become 
interested in the area of global health is to ensure the safety 
and health of their own citizens. While this thesis may offer 
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The No-Nonsense Guide to HIV/AIDS. 2003. p. 27; Steven 
Radelet. Bush and Foriegn Aid. Foreign Affairs, Sept/Oct 
2003.; Ulf Kristofferson HIV/AIDS as a human security 
issue: a gender perspective. November 7th, 2000. 
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sson.htm; Kristiana Powell. HIV/AIDS and Security. The 
Ploughshares Monitor. Summer 2003 Volume 24 Issue 2. 
24  There are numerous examples of this. Many of them can be 
found in: De Campos, André Luiz Vieira. The Institute of 
Inter-American Affairs and Its Health Policies in Brazil 
during World War II. Presidential Studies Quarterly. Vol. 
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favour of donor money being spent on the improvement of service delivery by 
strengthening sectoral and local institutions (1998). 
  Taylor in his research Changing Patterns in International Health: Motivations and 
Relationships, looks at the history of foreign aid for health from the American 
government to international recipients (1979). He found several concerns with the current 
system. The first was that foreign donors get recognized for the money that they donate 
but local donors do not, this drives away local donors and increases the dependency of a 
country on foreign assistance (1979). The second concern Taylor found was that the 
American government fails to recognize the complexity of international health and as a 
result the programmes implemented are often culturally inappropriate (1979). Lastly, 
Taylor finds that the U.S. structures its aid programmes so that they benefit more than the 
recipient (1979). Taylor recommends that the U.S. government work with the local 
communities where they are implementing these health programmes and allow the local 
community to set their own health priorities (1979).  
  Sachs and Attaran (2001) agree with Taylor (1979). In their paper, Defining and 
refining international donor support for combating the AIDS pandemic, they conclude 
that allowing foreign aid recipients to design "anti-AIDS" programming is superior to 
allowing donors to set the priorities because recipients better understand the cultural and 
social practices (2001).  However, to control the aid priorities for HIV/AIDS, Sachs and 
Attaran suggest an independent panel of experts
25
 run under the auspices of UNAIDS 
review recipients’ HIV/AIDS plans and determine the plan based on scientific-evidence 
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for prevention and its level of potential success (2001). These experts would have the 
ability to amend prevention programming and although Sachs and Attaran suggest that the 
panel should not outright reject any recipient country proposal, they would have the 
power to recommend to donors which programmes should receive funding (2001). In this 
way, the panel of experts could undermine much of the intention of the proposal for 
recipient country-led HIV/AIDS programming and response design.  
  In a more positive spin on why donors might control health care funding, 
Kickbusch suggests that developing countries have been restricted in their internal health 
sovereignty since post-Cold War because donors are under increasing pressure to prove to 
their constituents that foreign aid works (2000). In order to keep donor countries' citizens 
supportive of foreign aid, donors had to show that aid was “efficient, made a difference 
on the spot, and fuelled a national interest 'back home'” (2000, p. 982). For health policy 
this meant recipient countries were restricted in their internal health sovereignty and had 
to implement the policies and programmes that were designed by donors (2000). 
Kickbusch describes how donors and agencies competed over delivery approaches in 
HIV/AIDS and other areas of health programming (2000). For recipient countries like 
Uganda, the approach described by Kickbusch would mean the loss of homegrown 
approaches to HIV/AIDS programming in favour of donor preferred methods.  
  Much of the literature demonstrates that U.S. interest in health care is tied to 
ensuring the safety of their own citizens. The motive for U.S. participation might at first 
appear a peripheral concern when recipient countries are receiving aid for health care. 
However, donating money that is tied to culturally inappropriate programmes can do 




  Despite the research outlined above, PEPFAR continues to dictate the prevention 
and treatment programming for HIV/AIDS in recipient countries (Institute of Medicine, 
2013). The Institute of Medicine’s recent research on PEPFAR strongly recommends that 
PEPFAR look at each country individually and understand their challenges with 
HIV/AIDS programming (2013). They then continue to recommend that recipient 
countries “have a say in programming” and increase collaboration between donor and 
recipient (Institute of Medicine, 2013).   
Foreign Aid and HIV/AIDS: Where is the money going? 
“There are other, more complicated reasons why we fail to turn more information into 
less HIV. They involve ideology, politics, money and history.” (Pisani, 2008)  
 HIV/AIDS has received unprecedented international funding and attention.
26
 Billions 
of dollars have been transferred from donor to recipient countries and organizations for 
the purpose of halting the spread of HIV/AIDS and combating the disease. The money 
that is transferred from donors to recipient countries or organizations may be earmarked 
by the donors for specific use or given to recipients to use as they see fit.
 27
 Akin to the 
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just one (HIV/AIDS) of many global health concerns has 
been widely criticised. Several authors feel that the focus 
on HIV/AIDS is to the detriment of other diseases and virus 
needing international funding. It is not within the scope of 
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Developing Countries. 2003.  
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argument above on foreign aid for development funding, money transferred for 
HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment creates debate as to whether tied or flexible funding 
leads to better outcomes and whether donor governments have their own political 
interests or the welfare of recipients as the goal of their decision making. 
  Similar to Taylor (1979), Justice (1986), Dollar and Pritchett's (1998) argument for 
health programming to be made culturally appropriate, Green (2003) and Shelton et al 
(2004) call for culturally appropriate uses of international HIV/AIDS funding. Theses 
scholars call for recipients to play more of a role in directing the allocation of HIV/AIDS 
funds and the development of culturally relevant and appropriate HIV prevention 
campaigns. Green (2003) and Pisani (2008) are concerned about the level of involvement 
and influence donor countries have on recipient countries' HIV/AIDS programming.  
  Green focuses on the global spread of U.S. HIV/AIDS education and prevention 
programmes (2003). Not only does he see these programmes as culturally incompatible 
on continents such as Africa because they focus on U.S. solutions such as condoms, but 
he argues they are outdated- having been designed in the 1980s
28
- and therefore they are 
not complimentary with modern policies or programmes (2003).  
  Pisani also argues that cultural appropriateness is important (2008). She discovers 
that many of the HIV/AIDS programmes that are tied to donor funding and implemented 
in several African countries are from Brazil and the U.S. (2008). She argues that the 
epidemics in these countries are significantly different from those on the African 
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continent (2008). Using an epidemiological assessment of the HIV/AIDS spread, Pisani 
argues that HIV/AIDS programmes and policies must target high risk populations first 
(2008). She proposes that donor countries look to successful government interventions on 
the continent- she offers the example of Uganda in the 1980s- to implement programming 
that is more culturally appropriate and targeted to higher-risk and vulnerable populations 
(2008). Both Green (2003) and Pisani (2008) agree that today's HIV/AIDS programming 
is based not on science but rather entrenched in politics. However, they disagree on what 
a Ugandan culturally-appropriate and homegrown campaign looks like.  
  Green believes that AB is a culturally appropriate HIV/AIDS prevention 
programmes for Uganda (2003). He argues that the U.S. is wrong to export policies like 
condom use that they used to control the spread in North America because it was used in 
very specific U.S. locations with high-risk and vulnerable groups (2003). For the general 
Ugandan population he calls for more culturally appropriate HIV/AIDS prevention 
programmes, like AB. He claims that AB policies are based on science, not just politics or 
theology (2003).  
  Pisani looks at which groups in developing countries are receiving the most 
HIV/AIDS funding (2008). Through her personal experience and anecdotal examples, 
Pisani tries to make the point that high-risk groups are often denied funding because the 
activities they engaged in are culturally taboo and therefore risky for politicians to get 
involved. Pisani argues that to curb the epidemic politics needs to be put aside, and high-
risk populations need policies and resources that will keep them safe (2008). Pisani sees 
both internal (recipient) and external (donor) politics needing to change before the 




  It is interesting to note that while Green sees the AB approach as culturally 
appropriate and homegrown in Uganda, Pisani, argues that condoms are culturally 
appropriate and a comprehensive HIV/AIDS approach (which includes condoms) is the 
homegrown approach. The literature can be conflicting with opposing sides arguing that 
science and culture is more in their favour.  
  Médecins Sans Frontières sees foreign aid as necessary to cover the costs of 
HIV/AIDS care and treatment (2009). However, they raise concern with the reliance of 
developing countries on foreign aid for HIV/AIDS because of the volatile and 
unpredictable nature of aid (2009). For example, in 2009 HIV/AIDS funding flat lined 
and PEPFAR decreased their funding to treatment programmes (MSF, 2009). Countries 
relying on this aid needed to quickly find additional resources or cut treatment and 
prevention services -which makes curbing an epidemic challenging. MSF encourages 
donor money to be spent on both treatment and prevention and they raise concerns that 
one may be chosen over another when the donors- instead of the recipients- are allocating 
funds (2003).  
  The debate within and outside the academic literature on where HIV/AIDS money 
is being spent goes beyond who is making the spending decisions on HIV/AIDS 
programming and focuses on where the money has gone. Helen Epstein says there are 
two types of AIDS:  slim AIDS and fat AIDS (2007). She uses the metaphorical pejorative 
fat AIDS to describe corruption of those receiving HIV/AIDS funding who then redirect 
those funds for personal gain- which results in your wallet becoming fatter (hence ‘fat 
AIDS’) (Epstein, 2007). Slim AIDS is the literal description of people infected with 




Much of the foreign aid that should be directed to prevention and treatment for 
HIV/AIDS is instead ending up in the ‘fat wallets’ of corrupt government and NGO 
agencies (Epstein, 2007). In fact, Wallace et al. claim that the money that can be made 
through attracting foreign aid for HIV/AIDS has played a strong role in elections in 
several countries of the Global South (2006). If a candidate can show to voters that their 
election will result in the country receiving increased foreign aid, that candidate is much 
more likely to be elected (Wallace et al., 2006). Slim AIDS might kill you, Fat AIDS will 
make you rich and perhaps put you in elected office. 
  Whether the debate is about where the foreign aid is spent or who controls the 
money, there is concern that the money dedicated to HIV/AIDS is being spent in areas 
politically comfortable to donors and recipients and not on areas that would be most 
effective- like on high-risk populations. However, there are debates within the literature 
as to what is a “homegrown” Ugandan approach to HIV/AIDS prevention and what a 
culturally appropriate prevention programme would include.  
  Aid for HIV/AIDS is used as a policy tool to please business and political interests 
rather than invest in proven strategies to decrease the spread of HIV/AIDS. Although 
there are multiple studies showing the effectiveness of a comprehensive approach to 
HIV/AIDS prevention, there is some literature that ignores this evidence and continues to 





Foreign Aid and Uganda 
  There is a concern that Uganda has become too dependent on foreign aid. Several 
authors like Gordenker (1976) and Hayter (1971) caution recipient countries that 
establishing a relationship with donor countries will lead to dependency. This is what has 
happed to Uganda. 
 Gordenker (1976) describes international donors as having a conscious and 
subconscious influence on recipient countries. This influence leads recipients to tailor 
programming to attract increased aid rather than designing programmes for the best 
outcome in each recipient country (1976). Gordenker could not find any “rational means 
of selecting donor targets”, by which he means, recipient countries were choosing donors 
based on availability of funds and with whom they held political favour, rather than on 
the technical ability of the donor to assist them (1976, 92).  
  As of 2010, Uganda had received $1.7 billion in foreign aid. In that same year, the 
amount of foreign aid given to Uganda was equivalent to 10.4 per cent of their gross 
national income (Global Humanitarian Assistance).  
  Uganda is dependent on foreign aid (Wallace et al, 2006). According to Wallace et 
al., Ugandans have even elected their President based on their ability to attract foreign aid 
(2006). This dependency has left Uganda vulnerable to the whims and programming 
desires of donors. Extreme aid dependency has created a government agenda that is more 
responsive to donor demand than to their local needs (Wallace et al., 2006).  
  The Ugandan government contributes 9.8 per cent to the country’s health care 
budget. They rely on international donors for the rest (Leahy and Akitobi, 2009). Seventy 




donors (USAID, 2002) and this means that donors have control over how 70 per cent of 
the HIV/AIDS funding is spent (Wallace et at., 2006).  
  There have been several shortages of HIV testing kits in Uganda. Some people 
blame this on corruption occurring among Ugandan politicians (Kityo, 2013), others say 
the issue lies with the Ugandan government’s supply-chain management (“Uganda 
running out of ARVs, HIV test kits”, 2013). Whatever the cause, Uganda is now in need 
of assistance from foreign donors to support the procurement of these kits (UNGASS, 
2007; IRIN, 2013). If donor funds were to be withdrawn, Uganda may not be able to 
continue testing for HIV/AIDS.  
  Uganda’s dependency on aid also leaves them with less culturally relevant policies 
and programmes. Wallace et al., (2006) and Oomman et al,.(2007) found that Uganda had 
similar aid conditionalities placed upon them, as several other African countries despite 
their unique challenges and different epidemiological trends. 
  If the research by Wallace et al., Oomman, Leahy and Akitobi, and Gordenker are 
correct and foreign aid can lead to dependency on donor countries, Uganda’s acceptance 
of significant funding from PEPFAR would leave them vulnerable to the whims and 
desires of the U.S. This is particularly concerning when the effectiveness of donor funded 
programming is a matter of life or death.  
  Hopkins reminds us that donors have a motivation to donate (2002).  And Lancaster 
tells us that foreign aid is granted to recipient countries often on the basis of who is 
important or valuable to the donor country (2007). This leaves the question of why is 




   In the next chapter this thesis will explore why Uganda in particular is seen as 
diplomatically important to the U.S. and why the U.S. is willing to send vast amounts of 





Chapter 3: Findings 
  PEPFAR has dramatically changed the face of HIV/AIDS sexual health 
programming in developing countries such as Uganda through policies attached to foreign 
aid. Below I will discuss how and in which ways Uganda’s HIV/AIDS programming was 
altered as a response to PEPFAR.  
Uganda's HIV/AIDS prevention programme: Before PEPFAR 
  Uganda's HIV/AIDS campaign in the 1980s has been recognized as a tremendous 
success by the international development community, epidemiologists, and governments 
around the world. The main features of the campaign were behavioural change 
(abstinence and partner reduction), destigmatization, and political leadership (Goliber, 
2000; USAID, 2002; Black and White, 2003; Green, 2003; Parkhurst, 2004; Cohen and 
Tate, 2006; Green et al., 2006; Pisani, 2008; Parkhurst, 2010; Halperin, 2011; Avert, 
2013). There are also reports that show condoms played an extensive role in the 1990s 
campaign (Goliber, 2000; Cohen and Tate, 2006; Kirby and Halperin, 2008; Wawer, 
2005; UAC, 2007; and Pisani, 2008). 
  The Ugandan government and President Museveni 
wallpapered the country with posters telling people exactly how AIDS was spread and 
exactly how it could be prevented. The state (Senegal and Uganda) presidents talked 
about the disease, they talked about old men having sex with young girls, they talked 
about people's penchant for having several partners at once. That allowed everyone else in 
the country to start talking, too. In Uganda, 'zero grazing' became something of a 
mantra...the presidents urged people to use condoms. Their rhetoric was eventually 
backed with massive distribution of well-packaged, cleverly marked condoms (Pisani, 
2008, 145).  
 
  When Uganda first fought the AIDS epidemic in the 1980s, infection rates were 
approximately 29 per cent (Avert, 2013). Most people knew a family, friend or 




Lutaaya, President Museveni, Dr. Noerine Kaleeba and Reverend Gideon Byamugisha, 
among others, spoke out about being infected and/or affected by HIV/AIDS (Basude, 
n.d.). Having multiple messages and people from different organizations and backgrounds 
is thought to have helped decrease the stigma of having the disease (Green et al., 2006; 
Mubang, 2011).  
  The initial campaign in Uganda happened before antiretroviral drugs were 
available. People saw their friends, family, community members and celebrities die of 
AIDS. It was a frightening time and a diagnosis of HIV/AIDS was fatal. Behavioural 
change campaigns may have been successful because people were terrified and willing to 
adopt new behaviours such as abstention, partner reduction, and/or condoms (Pisani, 
2008; Parkhurst, 2010).  
  Parkhurst offered a comparison of Uganda and South Africa's HIV/AIDS 
prevention programmes. In The Political Environment of HIV, Parkhurst finds Uganda's 
diversified and varied approach to prevention, which included multiple actors, was the 
key to its initial success (2004). Parkhurst argues for a continuation of diversified 
messaging, the engagement of a variety of participants- NGOS, churches, aid 
organizations, international governments- and for the community to control the campaign, 
not just the government (2004).  
  The results of a varied and comprehensive campaign for Uganda (that may have 




young people waited longer to have sex
29
, and condom use rose (Pisani, 2008; Avert, 
2013).  
The start of the HIV/AIDS Epidemic in the U.S. 
  According to accounts by C. Everette Koop, who served as the American Surgeon 
General from 1982 until 1989, the U.S. has put politics before people in the fight against 
HIV/AIDS (National Library of Medicine; CDC). From the beginning of the AIDS 
epidemic, the U.S. government was focused on the political consequences of their 
involvement in what was called “gay-related immune deficiency syndrome” (National 
Library of Medicine, n.d.; AGEIS, 2004). In the early 1980s, when AIDS first emerged it 
was highly stigmatized. Being a virus that was thought to only affect homosexual men 
and intravenous drug users, the U.S. President at the time, Ronald Reagan, distanced 
himself as much as possible from AIDS (AGEiS , 2004; AVERT n.d.). Reagan submitted 
requests to cut the government's AIDS budget as his government pretended not to be 
aware of AIDS (AGEiS, 2004; AVERT n.d.). Despite recommendations by his Surgeon 
General to implement comprehensive sexual education in schools throughout the country 
(National Library of Medicine, n.d.; Boston Globe, 1986; AVERT, n.d. c; AGEiS, 2004), 
Reagan's administration promoted abstinence-only sexual education (AEGiS, 2004).  
  The National Library of Medicine houses some of C. Everette Koop's 
correspondence during the early to mid-1980s. His letters to government officials show 
that he requested to address Americans on AIDS: “if ever there was a disease made for a 
Surgeon General, it was AIDS," Koop said (National Library of Medicine, n.d.). Koop 
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was not granted permission to act on AIDS until 1986- five years after the American 
AIDS crisis began. The reasons for initially denying Koop the opportunity to speak 
publicly about AIDS was never made clear, but Koop insists that it was political (National 
Library of Medicine, n.d.).  
  C. Everette Koop was very concerned that politics would interfere with his report 
on AIDS and prevention, particularly on his recommendation for condom use (National 
Library of Medicine, n.d.; The New York Times, 2003). To protect his report, Koop 
severely limited his number of advisers and did not submit drafts to the American 
government before publication (National Library of Medicine, n.d.). 
  Despite facing an epidemic that was expected to kill 179,000 people (Chicago 
Tribune, 1986), the Reagan administration chose to keep quiet about HIV/AIDS for the 
first five years of the epidemic. They implemented abstinence-only education against the 
advice of the Surgeon General (AEGiS, 2004) and despite the ability of condoms to save 
lives if people were educated on their use, the Administration forwent promoting them 
(Schenectady Gazette, 1987; Daily Beast, 2013). Many of the Republican supporters were 
opposed to homosexual activity and pre-marital sex (Milburn and Conrad, 1996). 
Condoms were seen as promoting premarital sex and therefore working on HIV 
prevention programming was too politically contentious for Reagan. 
  While the U.S. battled internally with right-wing and religious beliefs over 
abstinence and condom use to fight HIV/AIDS, Uganda had created a comprehensive 
approach to HIV/AIDS prevention which included messaging on abstinence, partner 
reduction, and condoms. AIDS in the U.S. was highly stigmatized because political 




and religious leaders (Pat Robertson and Jerry Falwell) were speaking out against many 
prevention  efforts, particularly comprehensive sexual health education that included 
condoms (Forward, 2003). Meanwhile, Uganda's leadership was very involved in 
HIV/AIDS prevention efforts. A diverse group of leaders (clergymen, celebrities, and 
politicians) vocally supported prevention efforts. The initial effort to slow the spread of 
HIV in the U.S. and Uganda were vastly different.   
The Rise of HIV/AIDS in Uganda and the U.S. 
  During the late 1980s even into the very early 2000s, Uganda had great success in 
lowering their HIV/AIDS rates. But by 2004, HIV/AIDS were on the rise again. One of 
the more popular theories as to why HIV/AIDS rates were once again rising suggested 
that seeing HIV positive people living long and healthy lives decreased peoples' concerns 
about contracting HIV and led to riskier sexual behaviour (Cohen and Tate, 2005; Pisani, 
2008; the Ugandan AIDS Commission, 2012; Do not backtrack on HIV/AIDS fight, 
2012; and Nantulya, 2013).  
  The theory supported by Cohen and Tate (2005), Pisani (2008), the Ugandan AIDS 
Commission (2012), the Editor of the Daily Monitor (“Do not backtrack on HIV/AIDS 
fight”, 2012) and Nantulya (2013) is called: prevention fatigue and disinhibition (Cohen, 
2005). Prevention fatigue argues that people who have changed behaviour due to some 
risk will eventually become tired of the new behaviour and return to their riskier previous 
behaviour. The theory of disinhibition, as Katz et al. notes, further complicates the 
situation as it states that “the perception of reduced risk itself makes risk-taking more 




  The occurrence of prevention fatigue in Uganda is noted in the literature for 
monogamous couples. Incidence modelling has shown that 43 per cent of new HIV 
infections have been occurring in faithful relationships (UAC, n.d; Uganda Ministry of 
Health, 2006).  According to Hogle et al., once a country has achieved a significant 
seroprevalence decline- like Uganda- a complex set of socio-cultural, epidemiological, 
and political elements affect the course of the epidemic (2002). 
  In the field of sexual behaviour change, prevention fatigue and disinhibition 
translates into people no longer practicing safe sex because they are tired of having to do 
so, they are not witnessing mass deaths due to HIV/AIDS, and they believe the risk is 
reduced to a point where it is worth having unsafe sex (Katz et al., 2002).     
 Prevention fatigue and disinhibition (although not always referred to in name) was 
widely reported in the early 2000s in San Francisco among men who have sex with men 
(MSM) (The San Francisco Department of Public Health, 2000).   In 2002, a study by 
Katz et al., found that MSM in San Francisco increased their risky sexual behaviour after 
beginning HAART (highly active anti-retroviral therapy) treatment. Through community 
surveys they found that: “as a result of the availability of HAART, HIV-negative men 
who have sex with men (MSM) are less concerned about contracting HIV, HIV-infected 
MSM are less concerned about transmitting HIV, and both groups are more likely to 
engage in unsafe sex. Also, because HAART decreases mortality and improves the quality 
of life of persons with AIDS, it has increased the number of persons living with 
HIV/AIDS who are engaging in sexual relations” (2002, 388). 
  Studies conducted outside of San Francisco and within the wider HIV positive 




HIV/AIDS in Europe (Bouhnik & Moatti et al., 2002), Côte D’Ivoire (Moatti et al., 2003) 
and Uganda (Bunnell et al., 2006; Biraro et al., 2013). Instead these studies concluded 
that HIV negative partners in steady HIV serodiscordant partnerships (a partnership in 
which one partner is HIV positive and the other is HIV negative) are at high risk for HIV 
acquisition if the HIV positive partner is not on ART or HAART.  
  In a longitudinal study (1989-2007) conducted in rural Uganda, evidence was found 
that supported ARVs ability to reduce transmission of HIV to an HIV negative partner 
(Biraro et al., 2013). “Counselling and testing for HIV, condoms, treatment of 
opportunistic infections and antiretroviral treatment have become increasingly available 
in recent years and are likely to explain the reduction in seroconversion rates over time. 
No seroconversions occurred among couples in which the HIV positive partner was on 
HAART. Reduced risk of HIV transmission in the present (sic) of HAART has been 
reported in other observational studies,
30
 and recently confirmed in a randomised clinical 
trial”
31
 (Biraro et al., 2013). In Côte d’Ivoire, patients receiving treatment or those who 
have access to ART were less likely to engage in unprotected sex than individuals not 
receiving therapy (Moatti et al., 2003).  
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  In Uganda, risky sexual behaviour and risk of HIV transmission both decreased 
after the first six months of at least one partner beginning ART and attending prevention 
programmes (Bunnell et al., 2006).  
  In the Bunnell et al. (2006) study, the period of study was limited to six-months. 
But the more recent study (2007) by Biraro et al., has shown that over a period of 20 
years, access to prevention counselling and treatment decreases seroconversions of 
discordant couples in Uganda (2013).  
  While Cohen and Tate (2005), Pisani (2008), the Ugandan AIDS Commission 
(2012), and Nantulya (2013) may be correct that in some places seeing PLWHAs lead 
healthy, long lives decreases fear of contracting the virus and this leads to increased risk-
taking sexual behaviour, this has not proven to be the result of prevention and treatment 
programmes in Uganda.   
  What these studies did not look at was the risk of prevention fatigue among 
discordant couples when the PLWHA cannot access ART. There is very little literature 
available on the risk taking behaviours of discordant couples where the PLWHA is not on 
ART. This is likely due to the ethics involved in such a situation. What we do know is that 
HIV/AIDS is rising among discordant couples, but there is a gap in the literature to tell us 
more about this situation: is the HIV-positive partner aware of their status? Why is that 
person not on ART (problems with access, affordability)? Why does that couple not 
practice safer sex with the use of condoms? 
  It does not appear that HIV/AIDS rates have risen solely as a result of AIDS fatigue 
and disinhibition among discordant couples involved in ART in Uganda. However, rates 




safer sex options or who are ignoring those options. Further research into this area needs 
to be completed, 
PEPFAR Changes the Global Response to HIV/AIDS 
  The U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator, Eric Goosby, claims that “the role of the U.S. 
health programs under the President's GHI (Global Health Initiative) is never to lead 
another nation’s response” (Goosby, 2010). Despite these words from Goosby, I will 
discuss how the U.S. has changed the prevention programmes of countries like Uganda. 
Being the largest financial donor for HIV/AIDS treatment and prevention, the U.S. has 
incredible influence on countries hoping to receive that funding. Many developing 
countries will want or need PEPFAR funding and when that funding is earmarked to 
specific activities, and, as such, it is reasonable to assume that a hopeful recipient would 
tailor their programming to meet the donor's funding requirements. It is one of the 
strongest arguments as to why the Ugandan government altered one of the most 
successful HIV/AIDS prevention programmes for a programme that was shown to be 
much less effective.  
  To understand why the American government is promoting a programme that has 
been shown ineffective at worst, or controversial at best, it is important to describe the 
fight for abstinence-only education in the U.S., as well as exploring how the American 
government may have influenced the Government of Uganda to promote abstinence-only 
sexual health prevention programmes.  
A Local Fight goes Global 
  In 2008, the U.S. congress was still was politically divided on whether 




be taught in schools and promoted to the public.  Despite several studies showing that 
only comprehensive sexual health education and programming could lead to significant 
and long-term behavioural change (Martiniuk et al., 2002; Gupta, 2004; Kirby, 2007; 
Kohler et al., 2008; Cheng et at, 2008), the U.S. federal government was still fighting 
nationally for abstinence-only sexual health education. 
  Kirby's 2007 study on comprehensive sexual health versus abstinence-only 
programming is one of the most extensive studies in the U.S. It reviews 54 case studies of 
U.S. sexual health programmes. Kirby showed that comprehensive sexual health 
programmes resulted in increased abstinence, a reduction in the number of sexual 
partners, increased condom use, and fewer students engaging in unprotected sex (2007). 
By contrast, abstinence-only programming had very little to no significance on long-term 
behaviour change because it did not eliminate risk, delay sexual initiation, or have an 
effect on the number of sexual partners, condom use, or rates of abstinence for 
participants (Kirby, 2007).  
  Although Kirby’s 2007 study is the most in-depth to-date, earlier studies (Kirby, 
2000; Martiniuk et al., 2002; Gupta, 2004) were reporting that sexual health education 
needed to be comprehensive. They were also laying doubt on the effectiveness of an 
abstinence-only approach. 
  Despite those earlier studies and their evidence, the U.S. continued their fight for an 
abstinence-only approach to HIV/AIDS prevention: 
In 2002, the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention removed a fact sheet on the 
effectiveness of condoms from its website and replaced it with a new fact sheet which, 
while factually accurate, eliminated instructions on how to use a condom properly and 
evidence indicating that condom education does not encourage sex in young 
people...Information on condom effectiveness was similarly altered on the website of the 




in 2004 require that AIDS organizations receiving federal funds include information about 
the “lack of effectiveness of condoms” in any HIV prevention educational materials that 
mention condoms. In 2002, the CDC erased from its website an entire section entitled 
“Programs that Work,” which had highlighted the effectiveness of comprehensive sex 
education programs.  (Cohen and Tate, 2005, p. 23) 
 
  Not only were government websites censored, but American NGOs, such as the 
Union of Concerned Scientists, accused the government of limiting evidence-based 
research (n.d.).  Instead of allowing scientists to report on the effectiveness- or lack there- 
of A-only sexual health education programmes, the government changed the criteria for 
determining effectiveness: 
The Bush administration distorted science-based performance measures to test whether 
abstinence-only programs were proving effective, such as charting the birth rate of female 
program participants. In place of such established measures, the Bush administration 
required the CDC to track only participants' program attendance and attitudes (Union of 
Concerned Scientists, n.d.).  
 
 According to the Union of Concerned Scientists, the Bush administration ended the 
project Programs that Work (n.d.).
32
 Before its funding was cut, Programs that Work had 
identified five sex education programs found to be effective. None of the effective 
programmes listed were abstinence-only and it is believed that because only 
comprehensive sexual health education could be found effective, Programs that Work was 
cancelled (Union of Concerned Scientists, n.d.; Act Up, 2003).
33
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 Through a search on the Centre for Disease Control website 
(www.CDC.gov) you can find a programme called: Chronic 
Disease Prevention and Health Promotion. This new 
programme promotes “school health” which includes sexual 
risk prevention. However, there does not seem to be any 




  Multiple studies and programmes all showed the effectiveness of comprehensive 
sexual health programmes. With little or no scientific evidence on the effectiveness of an 
abstinence-only approach to sexual health education, the Bush Administration’s continued 
push for abstinence-only sexual health education programming is based only on political 
ideology and theology.  
The Need for Evidence 
  Bendavid and Bhattacharya offer one of the few studies of PEPFAR’s impact on 
HIV/AIDS treatment and prevention in several African countries (Uganda was not 
included in this study) (2009). Bendavid and Bhattacharya compared African countries 
rates of HIV-related deaths, number of PLWHA, and prevalence of HIV/AIDS (2009). 
They conclude that while treatment in countries receiving PEPFAR funds (as opposed to 
their control countries which are not receiving PEPFAR funding) has reduced HIV-related 
deaths, prevalence trends between control countries and PEPFAR funded countries did 
not differ (2009). To affect a reduction in HIV prevalence, both HIV incidences must be 
reduced and the population size must increase to offset the reduction in deaths from 
HIV/AIDS. If the control countries have a higher HIV-related death rate, their HIV 
prevalence should be decreasing when compared to focus countries that have significantly 
lower (10 per cent) HIV-related deaths. Bendavid and Bhattacharya suggest further 
research needs to be conducted into the effectiveness of PEPFAR funded HIV prevention 
(2009).  While specific conclusions on PEPFAR’s effectiveness to prevent HIV/AIDS in 
Uganda cannot be drawn from Bendavid and Bharracharya’s research (2009), it does 
                                                                                                                                                  
to abstinence-only education and therefore may not be a 





highlight the need for further research into the effectiveness of PEPFAR’s prevention 
programming.  
  The Institute of Medicine conducted a ten-year study on the effectiveness of 
PEPFAR in the countries it donated to and where they implemented programming (2013). 
The research found no information from PEPFAR on the HIV cases they managed to 
avert because of their prevention funding (Institute of Medicine, 2013).  Similar to 
Bendavid and Bharracharya, the Institute of Medicine concluded that PEPFAR needed to 
study its effectiveness with averting further HIV transmission (2013). 
  In 2003, the American government announced the PEPFAR regulation that 
earmarked 33 per cent of PEPFAR funding to Abstinence-until-marriage and faithfulness 
programming only- not comprehensive sexual health campaigns. Because studies were 
just beginning in the area of sexual health education and behavioural change at that time, 
it is fair to allow the government to claim ignorance. But by 2008, despite numerous 
studies showing that only comprehensive programming is able to curb an HIV/AIDS 
epidemic (Martiniuk et al., 2002; Gupta, 2004; Kirby, 2007; Cheng et at, 2008), the U.S. 
government increased its 33 per cent target of PEPFAR funds to 50 per cent of PEPFAR's 
HIV/AIDS prevention funding to be spent on only abstinence and fidelity programmes 
(Kaiser Family Foundation, 2008).  
  From both studies in the U.S. on the effectiveness of comprehensive sexual health 
programmes and from case studies of Uganda’s early success in the 1980s and 1990s it is 
clear that a comprehensive sexual health prevention program is effective and the U.S. 
government’s push for an abstinence-only prevention agenda both at home and overseas 




Spreading the ‘Good’ Word 
  Gusman suggests that the Ugandan reduction in HIV/AIDS rates and its emphasis 
on “family values” as a way to prevent the spread was “useful for right-wing politics in 
the U.S., supported by evangelical Christians.” (2009, 71)  Gusman argues that Uganda’s 
initial success was a “victory of religious moralism: of persuading people to become born 
again, “saved,” and therefore to live “safe” lives.” (Gusman, 2009, 72)  
   Butler describes the renewed interest in the international arena as an opportunity 
for the Christian Right to find allies in other religious movements. She uses the term 
“religious right” to describe a coalition of conservative protestant evangelicals, 
Pentecostals, Charismatics , and fundamentalists of the Christian Right. Aziz and 
Glaubman note that religious boundaries are changing and now even right-wing agents of 
Catholics, Mormons, Orthodox Jews and increasingly (although still more marginalized) 
Muslims  feel they are more likely to find support overseas than among U.S. liberals on 
their issues of family and motherhood (Aziz and Glaubman in Butler, 2000). 
  To collect the money that is needed to continue to grow their movement and build 
their political influence, the religious right has been lobbying both internationally and 
domestically (Butler, 2000). On the international level, Christian organizations 
(conservative Protestant Evangelicals, Pentecostals, Charismatics, and fundamentalists) 
have increased the power of their ‘pro-family’ voice by working with Islamist, Muslim, 
and Jewish countries and organizations to have their opinions heard at international 
conferences and meetings (Butler, 2000). The religious right have staged protests, and 
filled conference floors at UN meetings arguing against feminist policies, sexual 




  Domestically, evangelicals banned together and began lobbying for policies of 
religious freedom which would limit the interference of the state (Hofer, 2003). They 
were successful in 2002, when money that was earmarked for international HIV/AIDS 
work was withheld from NGOs that had reproductive health programmes in developing 
countries or taught HIV/AIDS education in Afghanistan (Hofer, 2003). They won again 
when the Bush administration redirected international funding from multilateral groups to 
Faith Based Organizations (Hofer, 2003).    
  The 2003 United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria 
Act – the act which created PEPFAR- required 33 per cent of PEPFAR funding to be 
spent on abstinence-only programming. This requirement opened the door to groups that 
promote A-only sexual health education, mostly faith-based organizations, like American 
evangelicals (Office of the U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator, 2006; Hensarling, 2008).  
  Non-secular NGOs that work in HIV/AIDS prevention have found themselves in 
compromising positions by accepting PEPFAR funding. In 2003, the requirement that 33 
per cent of funding go to abstinence-only education put pressure on NGOs to comply and 
ensure that 33 per cent of their funding was spent on a-only programming even if they 
considered themselves followers of evidence-based programming.  In 2008, the focus on 
A-only prevention was increased to 50 per cent and PEPFAR’s  primary partners found in 
non-compliance with this requirement had to report to congress (PEPFAR, 2008).  
  The introduction of the Anti-Prostitution Pledge in 2003, forced foreign NGOs 
accepting PEPFAR funding to sign and agree to not work with sex workers. This placed 
many of the NGOs working on comprehensive sexual health programmes in a challenging 




most vulnerable to HIV/AIDS, or not sign the pledge and become ineligible for the largest 
source of international funding 
34
(Middleburg, 2006; Centre for Health and Gender 
Equity, 2008). 
  Due to the APP, both the Brazil National AIDS Commission and the BBC World 
Service Trust withdrew applications for PEPFAR funding and returned the previous 
money they had received for HIV/AIDS programming. They decided that signing the APP 
would compromise their work (Middleburg, 2006).  
  Similar to PEPFAR’s abstinence-only policy, the APP did not come from evidence-
based research that showed that ignoring sex workers would decrease a country’s rate of 
newly acquired HIV/AIDS infections. Instead, according to Pisani, it would increase 
those rates (2008). The APP was once again an ideologically driven policy being 
aggressively marketed to developing countries by tying the pledge to foreign aid from the 
world’s largest funder.  
  PEPFAR’s funding requirements (APP and abstinence-only education) have 
excluded some groups from receiving PEPFAR money because they are unwilling to 
adopt anti-prostitution policies or offer abstinence programming. With less groups 
competing for funding, there are more funds available for religious and conservative 
organizations (Centre for Health and Gender Equity, 2008).  
 PEPFAR is seen as a major accomplishment for many faith-based organizations:  
...prior to PEPFAR, the U.S. Government and other Western donors only supported 
condom prevention programs, even in generalized epidemics. Faith-based organizations, 
                                                 
34
 It should be noted that the APP was also implemented in the 
U.S. in 2005. It was challenged in court and the APP was 
struck down. However, the court ruling applied only to 
U.S.-based AIDS funding recipients, meaning that many 
international PEPFAR aid recipients still need to sign the 




including both large organizations such as Catholic Relief Services and small 
organizations working within local communities, assert that before 2004 it was 
impossible for them to obtain U.S. funding for prevention programs that focused on 
abstinence and be faithful behavioral change. Representatives of the U.S. Agency for 
International Development working in the field admit privately that they laughed at the 
thought of funding abstinence programs (Hensarling, 2004, 3-4).  
 
 Not only has PEPFAR provided funds to Faith Based Organizations (FBOs) already in 
existence, but it lead to the creation of many more:  
There are numerous organizations in existence that would benefit from PEPFAR funding 
for HIV/AIDS programs—organizations that do not perform and/or promote abortion. 
Many of these organizations may not have existed prior to PEPFAR, but have developed 
since U.S. aid to Africa has increased (Hensarling, 2004, 3).   
 
  PEPFAR was launched with much fanfare, particularly by the faith-based and 
religiously conservative community. However, critics were immediately vocal on the 
emphasis placed on abstinence-only sexual education . 
How PEPFAR is changing the HIV/AIDS policies of Uganda 
   PEPFAR was founded in 2003 and known then as the 'U.S. Global AIDS Initiative' 
(Avert, n.d. e). In 2004, the Initiative was renamed "PEPFAR". The 2004-2006 budget 
earmarked 33 per cent of PEPFAR funding to AB only prevention methods. The Office of 
the U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator (OGAC) reported in 2006 that PEPFAR country teams 
felt restricted by the earmarked funds because they did not allow the teams enough 
flexibility to respond in a culturally appropriate manner to the threat of HIV/AIDS in 
recipient countries (United States Government Accountability Office, 2006).  
  American funding for HIV/AIDS prevention, offered through PEPFAR, has 
immense control over the allocation of funds in recipient countries by tying money to the 
implementation of American policies such as abstinence-only. Recipient countries, like 




largest global funder for HIV/AIDS. U.S. funding has likely played a role in Uganda's 
recent adoption of the American AB model of HIV/AIDS prevention despite their earlier 
success with more comprehensive approaches to prevention. 
 The American government claims to recognize the important role condoms have 
played in decreasing the HIV/AIDS rate in Uganda:  
USG (United States Government) recognizes success of early comprehensive (including 
condoms) prevention programmes...USG resources have supported all components of the 
Ugandan response (to the HIV/AIDS epidemic) (PEPFAR, Country Operational Plans: 
Uganda, 2004).  
 
But despite their stated recognition of the importance of comprehensive prevention 
programming (which should include condoms), PEPFAR's 2004 Country Operational 
Plan (COP) for Uganda calls for the inclusion of several new items:  
...an increased focus on A (abstinence-only) for youth...a (new) system for delivering AB 
programs, and a new partnership will fund grants to Uganda faith-based and non-
governmental groups. Up to eight grants will be given to groups focused on AB (2004, 
page 29).  
 
  The COP did not mention any funds to groups focusing on comprehensive or 
condom-inclusive prevention programmes. Of the twelve groups receiving grants from 
PEPFAR, three groups focused on comprehensive programming, eight groups focused on 
AB, and one group focused on B-only (author's own counting from PEPFAR's COP for 
Uganda, 2004- see the chart on the next page) Many of these partners are faith based 
organizations or work with sub-partners that are FBOs. Those that may indicate that they 
are not a FBO may still conduct religious practices such as praying and approach 
programming from a religious perspective.  PEPFAR does not argue that sending money 




is no evidence to support this. It is simply a matter of politics that FBOs receive a large 
percentage of PEPFAR funding for program implementation.  
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 AIDS/HIV Integrated Model District Program 
36
 AIM is a PEPFAR prime partner meaning that they support 
many sub-partners. Of their sub-partners, 27 are Faith 
Based Organizations and 28 are not.  
37
 AIDSMARK (like AIM) is a prime partner. AIDSMARK 
currently has 9 sub-partners of which 7 are FBOs. 
38
 UPHOLD is a prime partner. UPHOLD has 13 sub-partners 
of which one is a FBO.  
39
 Community Resilience Dialogue which includes: Catholic 
Relief Services, International Rescue Committee, and 
SAVE  
40
 CRD is a prime partner. They have 6 sub-partners of which 4 
are FBOs. 
41
 The AIDS Support Organization- this is one of the 
organizations mentioned on the previous page that while is 
not a FBO, they do still have religious practices.  
42
  The Health Communication Partnership 
43
 Ugandan Ministry of Education and Sports 
44
 The first part of the title followed by “care” has been 
redacted. The full name of the organization is not known.  
45
 ____CARE has 6-8 sub-partners of which 4-6 are FBOs.  
    
Ministry of Health  Yes No 
AIM35 Yes  Some
36
 
AIDSMARK Yes  Most
37
 
UPHOLD Yes  Some
38
 
CRD39 Yes  Most
40
 
TASO41  Yes No 
HCP42 Yes (B only)  No 
MoES43 Yes  No 














 According to the Government of Uganda’s own research, HIV/AIDS is spreading 
fastest among older populations (Wabwire-Mangen, 2009). The main driver of the 
epidemic is high risk sex which is defined as having unprotected sex with two or more 
concurrent partners (PEPFAR, 2008b; UNGASS, 2010). While the Government of 
Uganda does mention that they will work on increasing access to condoms, they do not 
include a plan or policy on condom education or promotion (PEPFAR, 2008b).  
  The government of Uganda also states that they will continue with abstinence-only 
education programs aimed at youth, even though HIV/AIDS is spreading fastest amongst 
an older population (PEPFAR, 2008b). This project (youth abstinence) is a personal 
passion of Uganda’s first lady Janet Museveni (Kalembe, 2005; Nyanzi & Nsangi, 2007; 
Masumbuko, 2007; Businge, 2009; Naturinda , 2009; Kalinaki, 2010) and yet it 
disregards the evidence that comprehensive planning provides a safer future for these 
youth. A-only education does not educate Ugandans on how to correctly use condoms. 
When youth become sexually active they will not have the skills to practice safe sex.  
   Hogle, et al., disagreed with PEPFAR’s emphasis on A and AB-only sexual health 
education. When writing in 2002 they saw the increasing need for condoms: "in more 
recent years, increased condom use has arguably contributed to the continuing decline in 
prevalence" (2002, 8). PEPFAR’s choice to fund AB is once again a political decision.  
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  Kamwi et al. wrote in defence of PEPFAR's focus on AB only (2006). They argued 
that there were many other donors offering funding for condoms and therefore recipients 
had options without needing PEPFAR funding (Kwami et al., 2006). Kamwi et al. did not 
see PEPFAR as restricting Uganda or other African countries' from offering 
comprehensive programming; instead, recipient countries just needed to achieve a 
comprehensive programme through a variety of funding sources (Kamwi et al., 2006).  
  However, Kamwi et al. (2006) did not consider the vast amount of money that 
PEPFAR offers in comparison to other donors. Nor did they consider the influence a large 
donor like PEPFAR has over small NGOs (Wallace et al, 2006; Rauh, 2010). It is unlikely 
that a small NGO would keep condoms in their prevention programming if they knew it 
would negatively impact their chances of getting money from the largest donor. In 2004, 
56 per cent of PEPFAR’s funding for the prevention of sexual transmission of HIV/AIDS 
was given to AB-only programmes (PEPFAR, 2005). Fifty-six per cent does not include 
the money spent on an additional 200 abstinence-only programmes (PEPFAR, 2005).
48
 
There is enormous financial pressure on NGOs to conform to the AB-only policies of 
PEPFAR if they wish to be eligible for over 50 per cent of the largest foreign aid 
donations to HIV/AIDS.   
  But PEPFAR is not appealing to those NGOs to conform; instead they wrote the 
funding allocation policies to benefit faith-based organizations. “The legislation's 
strengthened conscience clause (A or AB-only programming and the APP) is critical to 
ensuring continued participation by faith- and community-based partners, which are 
uniquely positioned to promote HIV/AIDS stigma reduction and prevention messages... 
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The bill ensures that these organizations will not be required to participate in or refer to 
any program or activity to which they have a religious or moral objection and ensures that 
they will not be discriminated against in procurement for refusing to do so” (PEPFAR, 
2008).  
  With PEPFAR being the largest provider of funding for international HIV/AIDS 
activities, groups that wanted to be able to access funds were given the strong message to 
conform. To have the best chance at getting PEPFAR grants, NGOs and countries needed 
to adopt abstinence and be faithful approaches to HIV/AIDS prevention. 
  Other than relying on the influence that they have as the largest donor, PEPFAR 
also earmarks funds to encourage countries like Uganda to commit to an A-only 
approach. In 2003, PEPFAR earmarked 33 per cent of its funding to Abstinence-until-
marriage programming. In 2008, 50 per cent of PEPFAR's HIV/AIDS prevention funding 
needed to be spent on abstinence and fidelity programmes. The remaining 50 per cent was 
to be spent on male circumcision, addressing multiple concurrent sexual partnering, 
research on microbicides, and supporting female and male condoms (Kaiser Family 
Foundation, 2008).  
  PEPFAR’s earmarking of funds and the funding of projects which were AB-
focused, groups working on HIV/AIDS prevention that needed funding were indirectly 
pressured to change their programming to meet the requirements of PEPFAR. The groups 
that benefitted most from PEPFAR’s funding requirements were faith-based 





Uganda Adopts AB 
  In 1981, the U.S. under Republic President Ronald Reagan pioneered “abstinence 
until marriage” programmes (Hardee et al., 2008; Parkhurst, 2010). These programmes 
were implemented before the HIV/AIDS epidemic by the religious community as a way 
to discourage youth from engaging in premarital sex (Howell and Keefe, 2007). Since 
then there has been much political praise to the effectiveness of abstinence education 
despite the scientific-evidence that shows abstinence-only education does not work 
(Martiniuk et al., 2002; Gupta, 2004; Kirby, 2007; Cheng et at, 2008).  
  While the Republican Party was trying to win the fight for Abstinence-only 
education in their home country, Uganda was running a campaign which focused on 
abstinence ("zero grazing"), being faithful (monogamy), and condoms.  According to 
Tumushabe, the Ugandan government had made condoms the third part of their 
HIV/AIDS prevention programme, thereby de-emphasising their importance in 
combating HIV/AIDS. This proved favourable to the Republicans- who wanted the focus 
on AB- and they began to advocate Uganda's "success story" as proof that the ABC model 
works (Tumushabe, 2006).  
  Having no successful U.S.examples of abstinence-only education being able to 
delay sexual debut or protect people from STIs, lobbying politicians would be a difficult 
job (Kirby 2000, 2007, 2008). It is much easier when you have a case study to point to. 
Fortunately for evangelicals and the religious right, both President and First Lady 
Museveni are well known and outspoken Evangelicals who just happen to live in the only 




  Although Uganda’s use of comprehensive sexual health (including condoms) 
programming early in their HIV/AIDS campaign is confirmed in the literature (Avert, 
n.d.d; Goliber, 2000; Wawer, 2005; Cohen and Tate, 2006; UAC, 2007; Kirby and 
Halperin, 2008; and Pisani, 2008) in 2002, Ugandan First Lady Janet Museveni, flew into 
Washington to the Congressional debates and presented Republicans with a formal letter 
that stated abstinence was the key to Uganda's initial HIV/AIDS prevention success 
(Epstein, 2005). The timing could not have been better for the Republicans as they were 
in the midst of heated debates with the democrats about a $1 billion proposal to spread 
abstinence-only sexual health programming to other countries through PEPFAR (Epstein, 
2005).  
  On June 11th, 2003, President Bush invited Museveni to the U.S. to showcase his 
success in Uganda. That same day Bush announced the $15 billion global AIDS bill that 
Congress had approved a month earlier (Tumushabe, 2006). Bush was trying to show that 
AB focused campaigns could work and that success in HIV prevention could be found in 
Africa (Tumushabe, 2006).  
  In 2004, President Museveni shocked the participants at the International 
HIV/AIDS conference being held in Bangkok by downplaying the role of condoms in 
Uganda’s campaign and suggesting that they played a small role when compared to 
abstinence and being faithful (Wendo and Odyek, 2004).  Museveni also claimed that in 
some instances condoms were harmful: “in some cultures sexual intercourse is so 




  The U.S. government began promoting Uganda’s success and claimed that the ABC 
programme they were implementing in the Global South through PEPFAR funding was 
based off of Uganda’s original and successful homegrown HIV prevention programme. 
  The Ugandan government agreed that the ABC strategy was their own, but claim 
that they underemphasised the ‘C’ (condoms) (Avert, n.d.f; Munaabi. 2007). Avert 
disagrees with this claim and argues that the Ugandan response in the 1990s gave equal 
weight to A, B and C (n.d.G) although it was called the “no grazing” campaign  
(Parkhurst, 2004; Hardee et al, n.d.) or “live and love faithfully” (Hardee et al., n.d.).  
  It was not condoms themselves that the Ugandan government was adamantly 
against, but rather the idea that promoting condoms was promoting sexual promiscuity 
among young people (Ssejoba, 2004). When talking about sexual education in schools, 
President Museveni said: “Be careful with some of these messages from foreign NGOs. 
For them they are saying a child can become a wife as long as she uses a condom. This is 
not the way to counsel our children.” (Okello & Okaba, 2012).  
  The term “ABC”  to refer to a comprehensive sexual health programme was  
created by Dr. Juan Flavier, Secretary of Health, Philippines in 1992 (Hardee et al, n.d.). 
The term was quickly accepted by the international community (Hardee et al, n.d.) but not 
used in Uganda until 2001 (Cohen and Tate, 2005) when the U.S. began to promote it 
internationally. According to Hardee et al, who conducted interviews with multiple people 
involved in the early HIV/AIDS epidemic in Uganda (pre-2000s), no one had used ‘ABC’ 
in the Uganda campaign prior to the U.S. introduction of it (n.d.).  
  ABC may also have roots in the US’ sexual health education programs (Hardee et 




monogamy, and condoms as the “ABCs of STDs” (Hardee et al., n.d., 12). Cohen and 
Tate refer to the definition of ABC- Abstinence for youth, Be Faithful for married 
couples, and Condoms for high-risk populations- as “uniquely American” (2005, 177). 
  By 2003, when PEPFAR was launched, the ABC model of HIV/AIDS prevention 
was widely recognized as a method for successful interventions (Hardee et al, n.d). 
Although PEPFAR’s version of ABC placed strong emphasis on AB and often condemned 
C, by naming the programme ‘ABC’ Bush could argue that a comprehensive strategy with 
international support was being implemented globally.  
  When facing criticism about PEPFAR’s programming actually being AB only, 
President Museveni’s claim that it was actually ‘AB’ that lead to Uganda’s success story 
gave Bush needed ‘proof’ that his programme works.  
  Even if AB sexual health education has not proven effective and its apparent 
success cannot be supported by evidence, the Bush administration has finally found a 
country willing to promote their cause. Uganda was used as a case study to support 
abstinence-only sexual health programmes which were favoured by the republicans since 
the days of Reagan.  
The Condom Shortage 
  In 2004, Uganda experienced a condom shortage. Due to complaints about the 
smell of the government subsidized condoms, the condoms were returned (later testing of 
the condoms in the U.S. showed them to be safe and effective). Uganda usually requires 
120 to 150 million condoms annually. In 2005, less than 40 million were provided (Avert, 




  For people wanting to use condoms, the only option was to purchase condoms 
shipped into the country from elsewhere. The Ugandan government then levied a tax on 
condoms shipped in from outside the country, which raised the price significantly and 
made those condoms unaffordable for many Ugandans (Altman, 2005).  
  In 2005, 2006 and 2010 more condom shortages occurred. This time the Ministry of 
Health's officers advised the public to start practising other forms of prevention, namely 
abstinence and monogamy (IRIN, 2010). From news reports, Ugandans were getting 
frustrated: "Why do they [the government] tell us to use condoms and then fail to make 
them available? It defeats their own HIV campaign" (IRIN, 2010).  
  Some international non-governmental organizations began to blame Uganda's 
condom shortages on the U.S. and PEPFAR's policies against condom use (Altman, 
2005). Uganda HIV/AIDS prevention workers were suspicious of the coincidental timing 
of PEPFAR restrictions on condom expenditure and the recall of Uganda’s condoms 
(Higgins & Norton, 2010). They felt that the U.S. government was encouraging Uganda 
to create barriers to condom access (Higgins & Norton, 2010).  
  Stephen Lewis, former Canadian Ambassador to the UN and then United Nations 
secretary general's special envoy for HIV/AIDS in Africa, said that "there is no question 
that the condom crisis in Uganda is being driven and exacerbated by PEPFAR and by the 
extreme policies that the administration in the United States is now pursuing" (Altman, 
2005).  Both he and Barbara Lee, U.S. Congresswomen spoke out at the XVI International 
AIDS press conference by stating that PEPFAR has placed "an inordinate emphasis on 
abstinence at the expense of condoms as part of the prevention dimension of PEPFAR... no 
government in the Western world has the right to dictate policy to African governments in 




  Randall Tobias
49
, U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator, spoke at the International AIDS 
conference in Bangkok (2004), he reassured the audience that the U.S. believed in 
condoms: “abstinence works, being faithful works, condoms work. Each has its place” 
(Human Rights Watch, 2004). But just three months earlier, Tobias stated that: “statistics 
show that condoms really have not been very effective...It's been the principal prevention 
device for the last twenty years, and I think one needs only to look at what's happening 
with the infection rates in the world to recognize that it has not been working.” (Kaiser 
Family Foundation, 2004. As quoted in: Human Rights Watch, 2004).  
  By 2004, President Museveni- who had been praised for his quick reaction to 
HIV/AIDS in the 1980s and 1990s and his early adoption of a comprehensive prevention 
campaign that focused on partner reduction, abstinence, and condom use was now 
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used to be the Chairman and CEO of Eli Lilly, a major US 
pharmaceutical company (CNN, 2007). In 2004, Eli Lilly's 
president was speaking at major conferences around the 
world about the potential for a new HIV vaccine. In 
speeches that year, he was mentioning that 80 potential new 
medicines for HIV/AIDS had been or were in the 
processing of being developed (Eli Lilly, 2004). It is not 
clear if Eli Lilly was working on one of these vaccines.  
 Tobias spent three years with PEPFAR promoting 
abstinence and being faithful and asking recipient countries 
to sign anti-prostitution pledges. In 2007, news broke that 
Tobias, a married man, was a client of an escort service- 





threatening to “open war on the condom sellers.” (The Monitor, 2001) Museveni said, 
“instead of saving life they are promoting promiscuity among young people...When I 
proposed the use and distribution of condoms, I wanted them to remain in town for the 
prostitutes to save their lives,” (New Vision, 2004), suggesting that condoms are not 
appropriate for the wider public but only for use by prostitutes and furthering the 
stigmatization of condoms.  
  By 2013, the Ugandan government was comfortable with neglecting condoms in 
their HIV/AIDS prevention strategy and suggesting that condom use can lead to an 
increased risk of contracting HIV/AIDS. According to the Uganda AIDS Commission 
(UAC), a strong contributing factor in the rise of HIV/AIDS was the promotion of 
condoms: “the use of condoms, for instance, led to increased high risk sexual behaviour 
amongst high risk populations in New York, driven by the perception that as long as you 
wear a condom it does not matter who you sleep with” (Nantulya, n.d.).    
  Oomman et al., compared three different PEPFAR funding recipients in Africa 
including Uganda (2007). They found that despite having different epidemiological 
contexts, the three countries had remarkably similar responses to HIV/AIDS 
programming (2007). The authors conclude that the earmarking of PEPFAR funds 
disallows prevention efforts to reflect the local context and recipient countries' priorities 
(2007).     
How PEPFAR might have affected Uganda’s HIV/AIDS prevalence 
  There are several limitations to this research. One of which is the ability to get 
accurate HIV/AIDS rates (Tumushabe, 2006). AIDS surveillance developed and 




door testing campaign which offered Ugandans free HIV/AIDS testing and counselling 
without them having to travel to clinics, hospitals or public testing locations (Mukisa, 
2013). HIV/AIDS testing also improved from blood tests at clinics to saliva tests with 
near instant results (authors own experience working in a health clinic in Misufini, 
Kenya). 
  Given these limitations, this thesis can still draw upon some general observations 
from the data to show how PEPFAR’s HIV/AIDS policies might have affected Uganda’s 
HIV/AIDS prevalence.  
  PEPFAR entered Uganda in 2004 and began a widespread HIV/AIDS treatment and 
prevention campaign. That year, treatment was rapidly scaled up, the price of 
antiretroviral drugs fell, and laboratory services improved (Ugandan Ministry of Health, 
2007/2008-2011/2012). Access to more treatment would have prevented deaths meaning 
more PLWHAs would be counted in the country and that could offset the impact of 
behavioural change programmes. People living longer with HIV/AIDS which may have 
been one reason the HIV/AIDS rate was stabilizing in the mid-2000s. 
  There was a need to examine new incidences (the number of new people found HIV 
positive) of HIV/AIDS to acquire a clearer picture of how prevention programmes were 
affecting the HIV/AIDS rate (UNAIDS, 2010b). Hogle and her team conducted a study 
that found that HIV/AIDS incidence peaked in the 1980s and fell in the 1990s. A fall in 
seroincidence
50
 meant that less people acquired HIV/AIDS (2002).  
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 According to The AIDS Education and Training Centres 
National Resource Centre, seroincidence is “the rate of new 
infections within a specific target population in a time 
period (http://www.aidsetc.org/aidsetc?page=home-00-00) . 
Hogle et al., had to rely in seroincidence rates because 




  But by 2009, the HIV prevention strategies of the past had been losing momentum, 
according to UAC (UAC, n.d.). The UAC found HIV incidence and prevalence rates 
stagnating and a threat of a re-surging epidemic in some parts of Uganda (UAC, n.d).  
  Incidence modelling has shown that 43 per cent of new HIV infections have been 
occurring in monogamous relationships (UAC, n.d).  According to Hogle et al., once a 
country has achieved a significant seroprevalence decline- like Uganda- a complex set of 
socio-cultural, epidemiological, and political elements affect the course of the epidemic 
(2002). This is the time when condoms are most important.  
  We also know that intercourse between discordant couples (one partner is HIV 
negative and the other partner is HIV positive) is one of the leading ways HIV/AIDS has 
been transmitted in recent years (Uganda Ministry of Health, 2006) and explains why 43 
per cent of new HIV infections are happening in monogamous relationships. The ABC 
campaign promotes C to be used when A and B are not an option. But couples who are 
monogamous are being faithful and yet they are often the people being infected. Condoms 
should be promoted to keep people in discordant relationships safe.  
  For those who know that they and their partners have a discordant HIV/AIDS 
status, the condom shortage and increased taxes on condoms may make obtaining 
condoms near impossible (New York Times, 2005). Further research needs to be done on 
the stigmatization of condoms that could be occurring with the new policies being 
introduced by PEPFAR, the Ugandan government, and through President and First Lady 
Museveni's "war" against condoms (Nyanzi and Nsangi, 2007).   
                                                                                                                                                  




  In 2003, PEPFAR announced that they would offer their first grants to developing 
countries for HIV/AIDS prevention in 2004. Knowing that PEPFAR was offering $15 
billion in HIV/AIDS funding would have encouraged countries like Uganda to change 
their prevention programmes and meet the requirements of PEPFAR.  
  The first year the HIV/AIDS prevalence rate stopped falling and stabilized at 6.4 
per cent in Uganda was in 2004. This may have been because access to antiretrovirals was 
increasing due to new funding for treatment provided by PEPFAR and that was combined 
with rising HIV/AIDS incidence.  
 HIV/AIDS prevalence and incidence rates in 2004 might also have been affected by 
PEPFAR's prevention policies. It was the first year Uganda had been given PEPFAR 
funding (PEPFAR had just started) and PEPFAR funds were very focused on AB-only 
prevention.  
  One year might be too short an amount of time for PEPFAR to have made such an 
impact in Uganda that it changed the rates of incidence. According to the OGAC 
behavioural change programmes can take some time to show their affect (2006). The 
OGAC uses the example of life skills programmes given to children under the age of 
sexual maturity. They suggest that the impact of these life skills programmes on sexual 
delay may not be present for some years (2006).  
  It is possible that even after one year of PEPFAR funds, more PLWHA were alive 
than would have been otherwise because of the increasing availability of ARVs and this 
could have made some impact on the HIV/AIDS rates.  
  It is possible that incidence rates were already on the rise before PEPFAR’s policies 




HIV/AIDS prevalence and incidence rates stopped their decline and either stabilized (for 
the first time in Uganda’s HIV/AIDS epidemic) or rose. HIV/AIDS prevalence rates 
remained stable at 6.4 per cent from 2003-2006. By 2007, both prevalence and incidence 
rates were on the rise (see page 14).  
  PEPFAR's prevention policies and programmes were implemented just as 
HIV/AIDS rates in Uganda were stabilising. The literature suggests that rates may be a 
reflection of people’s fatigue from behavioural change programming (Cohen and Tate, 
2005; Pisani, 2008; the Ugandan AIDS Commission, 2012; Do not backtrack on 
HIV/AIDS fight, 2012; and Nantulya, 2013). This thesis suggests that funding restrictions 
from PEPFAR may have exacerbated the situation by narrowing prevention programmes 
and limiting people’s prevention options.  
The need for a culturally appropriate HIV/AIDS response 
  This study finds that PEPFAR's sexual health policies are counter to modern 
understandings of health education. Instead of focusing on comprehensive sexual health 
programmes that include abstinence, being faithful, condoms, and strong political 
leadership, PEPFAR implements narrow prevention programmes that are acceptable to 
their political supporters at home.  
  During the 1990s when the HIV/AIDS epidemic was spreading quickly, Ugandans 
reacted by reducing their sexual partners and adopting less risky sexual activities. By the 
mid-2000s, Ugandans may have grown less fearful or been fatigued by the AIDS scare 
and by the start of the 21st century Ugandans were increasing their multiple partnerships 
(Cohen and Tate, 2005; Pisani, 2008; the Ugandan AIDS Commission, 2012; Do not 




  As the numbers of discordant couples rose and there became clear data on the need 
for  condoms (Pisani, 2008), the U.S. applied stricter regulations on PEPFAR funding 
limiting its availability for programming outside abstinence and monogamy and 
restricting outreach to sex workers.  
  The literature suggests that comprehensive sexual health programming is the most 
effective prevention programme (Silva, 2001; Kirby et al., 2006; Kirby, 2007), yet 
PEPFAR restricted NGOs from offering a diversity of prevention programming and 
messages by placing limits on non-AB expenditures. PEPFAR also choose to give money 
to mostly faith-based organizations that promoted AB and signed the APP. According to 
the Daily Monitor, in 2013, the September round of funding for mother-to-child 
HIV/AIDS prevention in Uganda was given only to faith-based organizations (Efforts 
against HIV commendable, 2013).   
  NGOs that wanted to receive PEPFAR funding were placed in challenging positions 
with their ethics and their ability to continue to serve their communities.  Uganda’s 
political leadership changed their view and opinions on comprehensive programming and 
even tried to re-write history by suggesting that condoms played a minor role in the initial 
HIV/AIDS decline (Munaabi, 2007; Butagira, 2012), even when the literature shows the 
strength of comprehensive programming (Hogle, J.A., et al., 2002; USAID, 2002; Black 
and White, 2003; Ruteikara, 2005; Parkhurst, J. O., 2010). It is clear that PEPFAR 
influenced a politically volatile public health landscape by introducing prevention 






Chapter 4: Conclusions and Recommendations 
  HIV/AIDS has become a development crisis for countries in the global south 
(World Bank, 2000). While treatment of HIV/AIDS is of significant importance to 
assisting developing countries, this thesis focused on methods and policies of HIV/AIDS 
prevention. To prevent future transmission of HIV/AIDS the literature recommends that 
comprehensive sexual health programmes be implemented everywhere. This thesis 
discussed Uganda’s initial decline in HIV/AIDS transmission which resulted from a 
comprehensive and homegrown approach to HIV prevention. However, since 2004, 
Uganda has been adapting their approach to adopt the U.S. government preferred, yet 
ineffective, sexual health education policy (namely the abstinence and be faithful 
method). The Government of Uganda did change its position on the use of condoms in the 
campaign against HIV/AIDS. Originally they promoted the use of condoms and provided 
them throughout the country. Uganda was influenced to deviate from evidence-based 
programming because of financial aid from the U.S. which was tied to the adoption of A-
only sexual health education and anti-prostitution policies and because of the strong 
lobbying efforts on behalf of the First Lady of Uganda. This thesis argued that the 
influence of donor countries through the giving of aid leads to policies that are politically 
driven and not always in the interest of development or the recipient country.  
  Not always does policy follow the evidence. In the case of American sexual health 
education programming and now (since 2004) Uganda’s HIV/AIDS prevention 
programming, policy has not been written on the basis of evidence. Comprehensive 
sexual health education programmes has resulted in at delaying the age of first sexual 




participants later in life. Abstinence-only sexual health education has not proven effective 
in the literature. Despite the scientific-evidence supporting comprehensive sexual health 
education, The Government of Uganda has proceeded with an abstinence and be-faithful 
model of prevention programming.  
  Uganda’s change in strategy from an evidence-based comprehensive sexual health 
model to an AB strategy known to be ineffective is a result of a complex process which 
includes internal and international politics and religion. Upon further study it was 
apparent that Ugandan President and First Lady Museveni were further persuaded to 
adopt AB only strategies because of their own religious beliefs and the strong interests 
and financial support of the evangelical community. The combination of religious 
lobbying, personally held religious beliefs (particularly for Janet Museveni) and financial 
aid through the adoption of PEPFAR policies culminated with the Ugandan leadership 
being willing to forgo effective HIV/AIDS prevention strategies to the determinate of 
Ugandan’s health.  
  Ugandans have also had a role to play. Prevention fatigue and disinhibition may be 
contributing to the rise in HIV/AIDS rates among serodiscordant couples. However the 
literature suggests that the availability of ART and HAART increases safe sex practices 
and decreases the risk of transmitting the virus to the HIV negative partner (Bunnell et al., 
2006; Biraro et al., 2013). Uganda needs to focus on increasing access to ART, HAART 
and condoms.  
  Outside the scope of this research, there are other factors that could have played a 
role in changing Ugandan HIV/AIDS prevention policy and that includes the policies of 




charities, religious organizations, and large international donors like the Global Fund and 
UNAIDS could also influence the behaviour and policies of Ugandans and their 
government. One of the recommendations coming out of this research would be to look at 
other major donors and financial contributors to the fight against HIV/AIDS in Uganda 
and examine their policies and impact on Uganda's HIV/AIDS epidemic.  
  This thesis found that the power relationship between donor and recipient was 
unequal. The donor country tied financial aid to the adoption of their programming and 
policy objective with little, if any, recognition of different cultural approaches to 
HIV/AIDS. Uganda was asked to adopt the same HIV/AIDS prevention programming as 
other PEPFAR recipients despite recommendations in the literature for culturally relevant 
programming. All PEPFAR recipients have the same funding restrictions placed on them.   
  In this study of the U.S. and Uganda, it was found that the U.S.’ internal politics 
were being brought to an international stage. Desperate to show that abstinence-only 
education can be effective, the U.S. government tied HIV/AIDS prevention policies to 
their PEPFAR funding. This policy action combined with complex internal politics and 
religious ideology influenced changes to Uganda’s HIV/AIDS  prevention programming 






To address the problems of donor power in global health, this study recommends:  
1. Multilateral funding 
 Several research articles conclude that bilateral funding is often the source of many 
problems between donor and recipient. Bilateral funding can strip recipients of their 
autonomy and create culturally irrelevant programming and policies.  When the U.S. 
announced its creation of PEPFAR, shortly after withdrawing some support from the 
Global Fund many people were concerned that this was an attempt by the U.S. to control 
the global response to HIV/AIDS. Money funnelled through multilateral organizations is 
often less controversial than money given bilaterally. 
  Further research would need to be done on the effectiveness of large multilateral 
organizations especially when dealing with pandemics. But this study would recommend 
that when possible multilateral organizations work with recipient countries to create 
culturally relevant and flexible responses to health epidemics (see the discussion in the 
literature review on Micheal Hudson and Denis Goulet, 1971 and Leon Gordenker, 1976). 
2. Donor impact on campaign outcomes 
  If bilateral funding continues, this study recommends further discussion of an 
international review panel as suggested by Attaran and Sachs (2001). Attaran and Sach do 
not explain who would sit on the international panel of expert they are proposing as an 
intermediary between aid donor and recipient. However, Attaran and Sachs suggest that 
such a panel be involved in the foreign aid policies and operational plans of donor and 
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 The Global Fund Data shows how much money was given to 
Uganda from The Global Fund for HIV/AIDS from 2002-2007 
(Rounds 1, 3, and 7- funding was not distributed between years 
2004-2006 due to allegations of corruption). Source: 
http://theglobalfund.org/fundingdecisions/ 
 The U.S. Funding data is gathered from The Greenbook- U.S. 
Overseas Loans & Grants: Custom Program Report Global 
HIV/AIDS Initiative Obligations (amount is in constant 2010 
US dollars). Bilateral American funding for HIV/AIDS 
prevention programming began in 2004.  
 Data on the national prevalence rates of HIV/AIDS in Uganda 
was taken from UNAIDS, as noted above.  
For further information on the challenges in collecting data 
from PEPFAR and the Global Fund, please see: “Follow the 
Funding for HIV/AIDS: A Comparative Analysis of the 
Funding Practices of PEPFAR, the Global Fund, and World 
Bank MAP in Mozambique, Uganda, and Zambia”.  Nandini 
Oomman, Michael Bernstein, Steven Rosenzweig. October 10, 









































Appendix A2: Chart of international HIV/AIDS 
funding and HIV/AIDS prevalence in Uganda 
 
Year Rate of  HIV/AIDS 
prevalence  
in Uganda 
The Global Fund 
contribution to 
Uganda 






2000 7.2 N/A N/A 
2001 6.9 N/A N/A 
2002 6.6 $26.2 N/A 
2003 6.4 $46.4 N/A 
2004 6.4 $0  $51.0 
2005 6.4 $0 $133.5 
2006 6.4 $0 $151.6 
2007 6.6 $100.2 $191.3 
2008 6.7 $0* $228.88* 
2009 6.9 $24.17* $269.83* 
2010 7.0 $4.35* $256.99* 
Data taken from UNAIDS, The Greenbook, and PEPFAR. Asterix (*) indicates data that 
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Appendix A3: Collection of data technique: 
Scoping 
Date Terms Results Database 
Refining 
Terms Best Fit 
Final 
number 
       
14/09/2012 
foreign aid policy and 




Library Full text American 20 
       
14/09/2012 
American foreign aid 
policy and global health 
donor influence 80 
Saint 
Mary's 
Library Full text 
Global health 
policy 5 
       
30/11/2012 
International foreign aid 
donor HIV/AIDS 125 
Saint 
Mary's 






       
12/12/2012 
PEPFAR Prevention -
chains -chest -botswana -
labs -"south africa" -
evaluating -dental -
workers -child -
circumcision -palliative - 
men -Zambia -gender -
blood -Obama -malaria -
PMTCT -head -injecting -









       
17/02/2013 
PEPFAR HIV/AIDS Uganda 
Prevention 2 PubMed 
Full text 
available Not just MSM 1 





PEPFAR -ARV -TB -drugs -











       
17/02/2013 
PEPFAR -Stores -gays -











       
03-Feb-13 
school based sexual 
health education 
behavioural change 
United States Uganda 37 
Saint 
Mary's 
Library Full text 1990-current 2 




madagascar -India -gay -
Nigeria -Namibia -malawi 
-PMTCT -Ghana -gender –
treatment 17 
Google 
Scholar English  4 
       
02-Mar-13 
evangelicals international 












       
28-Apr-13 
Janet Museveni HIV/AIDS 










       


























abstinence 15 Monitor English 
condoms, 
abstinence, 
donors, ABC 7 
       
10-Dec-13 
HIV/AIDS prevention 
fatigue among discordant 
couples no ART Uganda 3 
Saint 
Mary's ART Uganda 1 
       
10-Dec-13 
HIV/AIDS prevention 
fatigue among discordant 
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